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ABSTRACT
This study aims at exploring the possibility of a new 
concept of local curriculum. On the basic recognition that 
the New National Curriculum in Korea which is allegedly 
localized is not a localized one, this study analyzes the 
problems of Korean education and the New National 
Curriculum, and examines the new Korean curriculum in 
relation to debates on curriculum localization in the 
United States and England. The debates in the United 
States and England have been proved to be centered around 
the relinquishment of power of the central government to 
the local educational authorities and schools.
To search for a new concept of local curriculum, 
Foucault's and Lyotard's concepts of locality have been 
derived from their poststructural and postmodern 
philosophies. The main thesis in the concept is that 
validity of all knowledge is determined by the local 
participants. Consequently, a teacher's role in the 
classroom should be defined differently from the 
traditional way. This study suggests
"deprofessionalization" as a teacher's role in localized
iv
curriculum, invoking the Foucauldian concept of self- 
detachment and Lyotardian imagination and paralogy. 
"Dialogue" is suggested as a more concrete practice of 
deprofessionalization in the classroom. Some arguments for 
dialogue are analyzed and Bakhtinian dialogism based on 
such concepts as unfinalizability, heteroglossia, death of 
the author, meaning as a "historical event," intertextual 
construction of meaning, etc. is suggested as helpful to 
the practice of local curriculum.
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INTRODUCTION
Despite the recent efforts to centralize the power of 
curriculum decision-making by some right-wing politicians 
and fundamentalist religious groups in the United States 
and the English curriculum reform in 1988, localizing 
curriculum seems to be the general trend along with the 
gradual demise of authoritarian political systems over the 
world. Especially in Korea where authoritarian governments 
have had a very centralized curriculum policy for almost 50 
years, the central government has begun to relinquish 
curriculum decision-making to the local educational 
authorities and schools, corresponding to the recent 
democratizing trend in politics. However, this localizing 
policy does not seem to be sufficient to solve the vexing 
problems that Korean education has been having since 1945. 
Although this localization of curriculum in policy has 
produced some desirable by-products, such as the abolition 
of the so-called policy-subjects which have been used to 
justify the governmental system and dictatorship, the right 
to choose the actual content and method of curriculum still 
remains in the hands of the central government.
This study begins with a brief description of the 
Korean curricular reform history to reveal the problems of 
the Korean education and curriculum. This will show why 
the Korean government presented localized curriculum as a 
solution to the problems of Korean education. An analysis 
of the new National Curriculum which is allegedly localized 
will be provided to examine whether the new curriculum 
policy can be truly called a "local" curriculum. Debates 
around the issue of centralized-decentralized curriculum in 
the United States and England will be reviewed as well as 
compared with the new curriculum in Korea.
A basic assumption of this study is that a mere change 
in curriculum policy will not guarantee change in actual 
classroom practice, e.g., to local curriculum practice.
The teacher's role is critical in realizing the idea of 
local curriculum. Regarding the teacher's role in the 
classroom, Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge and 
Lyotardian postmodern philosophy is helpful in clarifying 
the concept of "locality." This study tries to extract the 
Foucauldian and Lyotardian concept of locality and relate 
it to the concept of local curriculum.
This study will suggest dialogue as a more concrete 
practice of local curriculum. Some contemporary 
educational theories about dialogue will be examined to 
find if these are appropriate in the practice of the local 
curriculum this study will develop. A Bakhtinian concept 
of dialogue will be suggested as a possible method of 
dealing with local differences in the classroom.
CHAPTER ONE
A BRIEF HISTORY OF CURRICULAR REFORMS IN KOREA
1.1. Before the Colonial Period ( -1910)
Before Japan annexed the Korean peninsula as its 
colony in 1910, Korea had developed its own educational 
system and curricula through almost 5,000 years of written 
history. The Koreans traditionally prized the humanities 
and regarded technicals and pragmatics as vulgar. The 
nobility learned Confucian ethics and philosophy from the 
primary community schools, and the practical subjects were 
for "the common people." All the primary schools and some 
secondary schools were established and managed privately, 
and the rest of the secondary schools were run by the 
central or provincial governments. The central government 
was responsible for higher education. Generally speaking, 
the curricula of the schools were for the state 
examination; that was the only means to becoming a 
government official.
Korea had been known to the Western countries as "the 
land of morning-calm" (Gregor, 1990) or "the hermit nation" 
(Griffis, 1905) until the feudal dynasty decided to open
the country to foreign intercourse in the mid-19th century; 
accordingly the Western missionaries - Catholic, 
Presbyterian and Methodist in turn - began to land in this 
apparently serene country, carrying their belief not only 
in God but also in the priority of their own culture. They 
opened, with a small group of children, the modern Western 
style (primary) schools as a part of their missionary work 
and taught them arithmetic, reading and writing of the 
Korean language as well as basic English. The dynasty too 
showed great interest in the new educational institutions 
and invited some teachers (H. V. Allen, H. B. Gilmore, B.
A. Bunker) from the U.S. and established some schools in 
the Western style. They began to teach foreign languages 
and practical technologies such as medicine in 1886. Those 
schools were recorded as the first modern schools in Korea 
(Underwood, 1926, pp. 11-16).
The government soon provided laws and ordinances for 
the new education along with other policies to reform the 
whole society, and local educationists began to establish 
new private schools for children of their community. In 
these private schools some teachers who recognized the 
peril their country confronted tried to inculcate
nationalistic spirit in their students and especially to 
bring to them an awareness of Japan's sinister intrigue to 
colonize Korea.
Because of the geopolitical nature of the country, 
however, Korea became the arena of the Power's competition; 
and the Great Powers such as the U.S., Japan, Russia and 
China did not let it take voluntary steps to modernize. 
After winning the Russo-Japan war, Japan forced Korea to 
conclude a protectorate treaty in 1905, by which Japan 
intervened in almost all politics in Korea. The Japanese 
supervisor started to implant the Japanese educational 
system and curricula into Korea and oppressed especially 
the nationalistic private schools.
Even before annexation, almost half of the officers of 
the central Ministry of Education were Japanese and they 
regulated the whole curricula of the primary and secondary 
schools. Japanese teachers came into the country and were 
placed in national and public schools. The proportion of 
class hours for the Japanese language education was the 
same as or more than those for the Korean language (Ham, 
1976, pp. 28-29, 33-34}. If a private school did not 
educate according to the curriculum the school could not be
authorized as a regular school. Textbooks which had not 
been published or approved by the Ministry were banned in 
schools; obviously this doctrine was aimed at those books 
used in private schools which promoted patriotism and the 
spirit of independence.
Dissatisfied even with this treaty, Japan in 1910 
replaced it with an annexation treaty making the Korean 
peninsula its colony; thus, all the efforts of the Korean 
government and people to modernize the education of this 
country ended in vain.
1.2. The Colonial Period (1910-1945)
Korean education during this period can be summarized 
as "Japanization and mobocracy." Japanization, or 
assimilation was officially expressed as "educating the 
subjects loyal to the Japanese Emperor" and mobocracy as 
"schools should educate aiming at making human workers 
according to the condition and standards of the people"
(Ham, 1976, pp. 65-67). In spite of the fact that Japan 
was constituted of small islands, they called their land an 
"inner continent," and "integration of inner land and 
Korea" was the official slogan which undergirded all the 
colonial policies. However in actuality, the educational
8policy of colonial Japan was to differentiate and 
discriminate the Korean from the Japanese. Underwood 
{1926) , who had been himself a missionary and educator in 
Korea since the late 18th century, summarizes the policy as 
follows:
The policy of the government. . .meant to all Koreans three things 
against all three of which they mentally rebelled. First, 
separate and different education for Koreans in Korea and 
Japanese in Korea. Second, the frank and rather bald statement 
that the chief object of the education offered was the making of 
loyal citizens of Japan; third, that education in Chosen (Korea) 
was to be adapted to the backward conditions and low mentality 
of the people (p. 192).
In other words, Korea was regarded as an object of 
exploitation not of investment. They did not permit higher 
education for Koreans. Korean students were to learn 
Japanese as their mother tongue and vocational training was 
inforced. Humanities were reduced to the minimum amount in 
the school curriculum. For example, history and geography 
were not taught in the primary schools. The Japanese tried 
to control and eventually close private schools, which were 
more in number than national and public schools. Regarding 
private schools, the Proconsul admonished the local 
governors as follows:
Among private schools, many are established and managed by 
foreign missionaries though there are some established by 
Koreans. Each governor must watch if the schools observe the 
laws and regulations, if the teachers perform their duties, if
9they are using textbooks published or approved by the Ministry 
of Education, and if they inspire useless patriotism and the 
spirit of independence by teaching some strange songs and 
others. Especially, mission schools have not been intervened by 
the Ministry because of diplomatic immunity. From now on, 
discipline them by emphasizing separation of religion and 
education, but be cautious not to offend their feelings (Lee,
1948, pp. 180-181).
This policy of "Japanization" and "mobocracy" in education 
was salient during the first decade of the colonial period.
To control private schools the Japanese revised "the 
Private School Law" (1915) in addition to the general 
educational laws and regulations so they could put the 
private schools in double fetters {Ham, 1976, pp. 72-74; 
Underwood, 1926, pp. 195-208) . The establishment of 
private schools became more complicated and difficult and 
teaching the Bible was banned by law. When a private 
school wanted to replace its principal or one of its 
teachers, approval from the local Governor was needed. A 
school teacher needed to have not merely a certificate but 
also a great command of Japanese. He was required to wear 
a uniform and sword while on duty. Great was the surprise 
at this severe policy among the founders, and teachers of 
the schools and protests soon came into bud.
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Even in the traditional informal community schools 
which numbered almost 25,000 in the nation, they forced the 
teaching of Japanese and the use of textbooks published or 
approved by the Ministry (Underwood, 1926, p. 179) . As a 
result, the number of schools and enrolments had 
continuously decreased until 1917 after the annexation (pp. 
175-178).
In 1919, a nation-wide independence movement which was 
influenced by "the principle of self-determination of 
peoples" proposed by the U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, 
broke out. Although the movement ended after six months 
with numerous deaths and arrests, the Japanese government 
changed its colonial policy, at least outwardly, from a 
military to a cultural one. The system of Military Police 
was abolished and teachers did not have to wear swords any 
more. School years for the Korean primary and secondary 
students were extended to the same years as those for 
Japanese students, and higher education was opened for 
Koreans.
The principle of "vocational education for the Korean" 
was partly abrogated, and humanities appeared in the school 
subjects along with foreign languages. They loosened the
strict qualifications for private school teachers and tried 
to appease the foreign missionaries by mitigating the 
absolute principle of separation of education from 
religion. The missionaries had been playing important 
roles in the protest, corresponding between the leaders of 
the independence movement in Korea and those of the Korean 
government-in-exile in Shanghai, China and publicizing the 
miserable state of the Korean people to their own 
government and people after returning to their countries.
However, the change of policy was so cunning that only 
three Koreans were appointed to the "committee of 
education" organized of 28 members to examine educational 
demands of the Korean people after the movement. Although 
Korean language was inserted into the primary and secondary 
school curricula, credit hours for it were still a third or 
a half of those of Japanese, and all textbooks were written 
in Japanese. Korean students still needed to learn the 
Japanese language, history and geography as if those were 
their own (Oh, 1964, pp. 284-286).
The major premise of colonial policy, that is, 
"Japanization and mobocracy, " was not changed, so that the 
new educational laws regulated that the foremost goal of
12
the primary and secondary schools was "cultivating educated 
workers loyal to the National(Japanese) spirit" (Ham, 1976, 
pp. 120,125). Students' strikes continually broke out and 
arrests of teachers and students followed.
In 1937, Japan opened war against China, accordingly 
education became a part of war organization. The most 
salient change in education was that the name of the 
schools for Koreans had the same name of the schools for 
Japanese and the Korean language became an elective subject 
from a required one. They prohibited Korean students from 
speaking Korean in schools and forced all Koreans to change 
their names to the Japanese style. Students were told even 
to watch one another lest they speak Korean.
After the air raid on Pearl Harbor, school years in 
colleges were reduced so that they could draft as many 
students as possible for the war. Humanities in the 
curriculum were replaced with science and technology, and 
the name "school" was literally changed to "training 
center." All the students either went to the battle front, 
or were utilized to provide their labor mobilizing war 
materials and foods or constructing runways and trenches.
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1.3. Period of American Military Government (1945-1948)
On August 15, 1945, Japan announced unconditional 
surrender to allied forces, and Korea was liberated from 
the Japanese colonialism according to the Potsdam 
Declaration. However, the liberation was an uncompleted 
one. Because the allied forces did not appreciate the 
Korean people's struggles for independence in and out of 
the Korean peninsula, the Potsdam Declaration regulated 
that Korea, different from other Western countries such as 
France, would be under the trusteeship of the U.S. and 
Russia. Regardless of the Korean people's will, the 
destiny of Korea was determined according to the interests 
of the powerful countries in the same way that Japan had 
won the tug of war over the peninsula some decades before.
After landing in the country, the U.S. military 
appointed, as the administrator of education, Captain E. L. 
Lockard who had been an English professor in a city college 
of Chicago. He organized the Korean Committee on 
Education, composed of 10 boards whose chairs were all 
Koreans. It was the most urgent for the committee to 
replace Japanese officials, provincial superintendents, 
principals, and teachers with Koreans. In the primary
schools over 40 percent of the teachers were Japanese, and 
the percentage in the secondary and higher level was more 
than that (Sohn, 1992, p. 248; Underwood, 1951, p. 19). 
However, because it was very difficult to find qualified 
people for the places after 36 years of colonial mobocracy, 
they could not strictly screen those who collaborated with 
the Japanese colonial government. It was also natural that 
those who had studied in the U.S. and could speak English 
had great influence in selecting personnel and deciding 
educational policies. After a few months the military 
government and the committee finished organizing the 
Department of Education. Apart from the Department, the 
Korean Committee on Education was rearranged and expanded 
to the Educational Council; it numbered about 100 members, 
a few of whom were from the American military.
Although the new Ministry adopted almost without 
modification the decisions made by the Council, the fact 
that the military government failed to punish traitors, or 
at least to exclude them from office, and that they mainly 
depended upon opinions of pro-American or pro-Western 
intellectuals, laid the groundwork for a series of anti- 
American movements some decades later. The U.S. Military's
identification of itself as "occupation forces" while the 
Russian Army called itself the "liberation army" did not 
help the American image. These rash behaviors and 
ignorance of the Korean history and culture of the 
occupation commander Gen. John R. Hodge and his staff have 
been frequently criticized not only by some Koreans (Sohn, 
1992) but also by some American scholars (Cumings, 1981; 
1983) .
The Military government reopened all schools and 
prepared temporary courses of study for these schools.
They prohibited the use of textbooks written in Japanese 
and regulated that Korean should be used as the 
instructional language. However, education could not be 
normal because there were limited numbers of qualified 
teachers and virtually no textbooks written in Korean.
Great efforts were made to teach Korean and train teachers. 
They were also concerned with adult education, by which 
they tried to teach the new social order and eradicate 
illiteracy. Probably at this time, the Korean people might 
have publicly heard the word "democracy" for the first time 
in their history. The illiteracy rate of those over 12 
years-old was then 77 percent (Committee on Compilation of
16
History of Education, 1960, p. 110). A 6-3-3-4 system, 
which was modeled itself after the American educational 
system was adopted as the basic structure of education. 
Japanese language classes were replaced with Korean, and 
English was put into the secondary school curriculum.
From September 1, 1946, the integrated subject "Social 
Studies" newly appeared in the primary school curriculum, 
which was an obvious influence of Deweyan Progressivism and 
of the Korean Educational Commission whose members had 
visited America for four months from March 1946.
Although textbooks of Korean language and Korean 
history were promptly published by a few Independent 
Movement groups that had maneuvered underground during the 
colonial period, other classes depended mainly upon 
blackboards and materials mimeographed by teachers because 
of the lack of the textbooks. The content of education 
could not far exceed that of the colonial period. In other 
words, despite getting their lost identity back, e.g., 
their own names, language, and history, they could not get 
rid of inertia because the Korean identity was not one they 
had won for themselves but was one others had suddenly 
brought to them. At this moment the American Educational
17
Mission introduced Deweyan concepts such as "experience" 
and "life." As a result, the so-called "New Education 
Movement" expanded throughout the nation. It seems to be 
the case that, taking into account the historical and 
cultural situation of the day, teachers and educationalists 
never fully or even well understood and appreciated the 
Deweyan educational theory based on democracy that 
undergirded the New Education Movement.
Although some name this period as the "period of no 
educational contents," paradoxically, this was the only 
period when Korean teachers enjoyed their freedom and 
autonomy regarding the content of education. Teachers 
could teach what they wanted because there were no 
curricula coerced from the outside.
1.4, Period of Subject-Centered Curriculum (1948-1962)
On August 15, 1948, the constitution was ratified, and 
Korea started its new history as a Republic, in spite of 
the vehement opposition from those who did not want a solid 
fixation of the partition of the country.
Even after the departure of the Republic of Korea, the 
situation in education did not improve from before.
Shortage of teachers, facilities, equipment, and textbooks
confused and bewildered Korean education. The most urgent 
need was to give some guidelines to teachers who had been 
just treading the colonial footsteps. According to The Law 
of Education enacted in 1949, "subjects of schools except 
for colleges, colleges of education, and informal schools 
shall be prescribed by a Presidential decree, and courses 
of study and class hours of those by a regulation of the 
Ministry" (Korean Education Law, Article 155) . The 
Ministry of Education regulated that the government publish 
all textbooks of the primary schools and textbooks of a few 
policy subjects of the secondary schools such as Korean 
language and literature, Korean history, and social life 
and that the rest of the textbooks be examined and approved 
by the government.
The Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950 when the 
government was trying to take more specific steps to 
provide textbooks to teachers and students. During three 
years of the wartime, education continued only nominally in 
the temporary tents wherever there were no battles. Even 
during war time, classes of the primary and secondary 
schools were mainly focusing on entrance examinations. 
Entrance examinations for both middle and high schools
19
existed until the 1970s. Even today, the college entrance 
examination is still most powerful, virtually dominating 
the contents and methods of the primary and secondary 
school curricula.
The results of the war regarding the content of 
education manifested itself in the government's 
scrutinization of school curriculum and its strengthening 
of the ideological in education. Anti-communism permeated 
all humanities and as in the U.S. communism became an 
antonym of the word "democracy." This anti-communist 
ideology and the central control system exerted great 
influences on the contents and methods of education, and 
consequently on teachers' autonomy thereafter.
As soon as the war ended -- technically it was 
suspended, at least officially, by the armistice agreement 
between the U.N. and North Korea -- the government 
announced the curricula for the primary and secondary 
schools in the form of a law in 1955, which was based upon 
Curriculum Handbook for the School of Korea published by 
the third American Educational Mission to Korea (Sohn,
1992, pp. 446-449). This has been recorded as the first 
official Korean curriculum after 1945. In this law,
20
curriculum meant the "organization of subjects and other 
educational activities of schools.” The government decided 
what, how much, and when to teach. Even for the subjects 
whose textbooks were not to be published by the government, 
courses of study including detailed chapters and contents 
were prepared.
Teachers and curricularists of the day seem to have 
accepted the General Transfer Theory or Mental (Formal) 
Discipline Theory. Except for broad-field subjects like 
"Social Studies” and an introduction of extracurricular 
activities (club activities) into the curriculum for one or 
two hours a week in the curriculum of 1955, no evidence 
could be found that the American Educational Mission that 
visited Korea 10 times from 1952 to 1961 and their Deweyan 
theory had influence upon classroom practices. Subject 
barriers were thought to be fixed and individual needs and 
differences subjected to the pre-organized uniform 
curriculum.
1.5. Period of Experience-Centered Curriculum (1962-1973)
In 1960, the authoritative President S. Lee, who had 
been in power from 1948, resigned and took refuge in Hawaii 
after a series of student protests against rigged
elections. However, even before various democratic 
measures of the new government were implemented, the 
government was overthrown in 1961 by a military coup 
d'etat. As a result, local superintendents and officials 
of education who had previously been elected by the 
inhabitants' vote were now appointed by the central 
government. On the one hand, the military government 
announced anti-communism as "its utmost policy," in order 
to get political support from the U.S. government who had 
at first been suspicious about the coup leader C. Park's 
ideological background. On the other hand, the coup 
leaders pledged economic development to console the Korean 
people.
In 1963, the curriculum was revised mainly to include 
contents justifying the coup in Humanities textbooks.
"Anti-communism" appeared as a distinct subject in the 
primary school curriculum. At this time, the Deweyan 
theory of "education as experience" was officially adopted, 
and curriculum was defined as "all learning activities 
which students experience under the guide of the school" 
(Research Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, p. 
11). William Kilpatrick's Project Method was introduced to
teachers, and peer group problem solving was encouraged to 
meet students' individual differences. However, curricular 
decisions were still made by the central government, and 
classes still focused on entrance examinations. Teachers 
were regarded as technicians who should sincerely transmit 
pre-selected and organized educational contents to 
students. Peer group problem solving was often 
misunderstood as solving the same problems in the same 
class by group.
Apart from the official introduction of the concept of 
experience-centered curriculum, the government's devotion 
to economic growth brought another impact on school 
curriculum. Efficiency emerged as an important virtue in 
Korean society and was used as a major excuse to amend the 
Constitution and hence to justify the long-term 
authoritative rule. Variety, differences, and discussions 
were rejected as inefficient. They even instituted and 
forced "students to memorize "the National Charter of 
Education" (1968), which stated that efficiency and 
practicality were "to be respected." In the political and 
social situation like this, education was almost
23
indoctrination and Deweyan theory had no place in 
curriculum practice.
Moreover, B. S. Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational 
Objectives (1956, translated into Korean in 1966) and R. F. 
Mager's concept of behavioral objectives (1961, translated 
into Korean in 1976) along with behavioral psychology were 
introduced and enjoyed general popularity among teachers 
and educators because of their efficiency-based nature. 
McClelland's Achievement Motive Theory was used to justify 
education for economic development, and B. Chung's 
definition of education was taught in colleges as the one 
and only definition: "Education is deliberate change of 
human behavior" (1970, p. 15). Education was regarded as 
the means to an end imposed externally, and nobody 
seriously raised questions about this.
Thus, despite the official definition of it, actual 
curriculum managed by classroom teachers was not unlike 
traditional subject-centered curriculum. Curriculum was 
still regarded as the means to an end extrinsically 
imposed, whether it was economic growth of the country or 
the growth of students' mental ability; and teachers were 
to transmit efficiently curricular knowlege to the passive
students. Continuing vestiges of Japanese Imperialism and 
a powerful hierarchical Confucian tradition could not be 
excluded from the various factors influencing Korean 
education and curriculum management. There were other 
reasons that experience-centered curriculum could not go 
beyond the level of an empty slogan - the overall qualities 
of teachers, poor facilities of schools, and objections 
from parents who wanted their children to pass without 
difficulty the entrance examinations to junior high, senior 
high schools, and colleges. Entrance examinations to 
junior and senior high schools were finally abolished for 
the "normal management of school curriculum" in 1968 and 
1974 respectively.
1.6. Period of Discipline-centered Curriculum (1973-1981)
In 1972, President C. Park, who had already been in 
power for a decade, declared a state of emergency amidst 
incessant student protests against his tyranny and amended 
the Constitution so that a provisory clause which had 
regulated the Presidential term limit was eliminated.
After this second and pro-government coup d'etat, the 
curriculum was revised again. Contents justifying the coup 
were newly included in such subjects as National Ethics,
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Korean History, and Social Life. At this time curriculum 
was defined as structures of the disciplines (Research 
Committee of Curriculum and Textbooks, 1990, pp. 19-20).
J. Bruner's theory of the structure of knowledge 
(1959) was fully accepted, and all the school subjects were 
encouraged to be organized into spiral curricula. Bruner's 
structure of knowledge was thought to correspond to J. 
Piaget's psychological schema. These theories were 
combined so effectively with the already renowned Tyler- 
Bloom-Mager rationale that curriculum should be composed of 
certain steps.
First, aims or objectives should be pre-determined. 
Broad and ideal aims should have already be set by the 
government, sometimes in the form of a law. Those specific 
to each subject should be decided by such specialists of 
the subjects as biologists for biology with the help of 
Bloom's taxonomy.
Second, the scope of the contents of each subject 
should be defined to achieve efficiently those aims and 
objectives. The contents should be structures which could 
represent characteristcs of each subject. Again, subject 
specialists would be able to do those jobs.
Third, the contents should be organized in a spiral 
form by the specialist. Bruner's and Piaget's theories, 
such as the three stages of representation - enactive, 
iconic, and symbolic - (Bruner, 1959) and the development 
of schema, would be very helpful in deciding when to teach 
particular concepts. Bloom's taxonomy and Mager's 
behavioral objectives would also help in this process. If 
the contents of each subject were well organized, teaching 
itself would not have great significance.
Fourth, teachers should measure, rather than evaluate, 
the degree of students' achievement according to the pre­
specified aims and objectives.
Teachers and even curricularists had no place in the 
school curriculum. So long as they did not raise serious 
questions about the contents they were teaching nor 
question the official methodology, teachers were safe.
Good teachers were those who transmitted efficiently 
textbook knowledge. They did not have to research 
something because a textbook was the only thing they should 
be concerned about, and the content of it would remain 
unchanged at least for the decade in which it was 
published.
To make matters worse, the government was so 
autocratic in this period that various control over the 
contents of classroom teaching as well as over the press 
was prominent. Military training had already been a 
required subject in senior high schools and colleges since 
the late 1960s, even in girls' high schools. The school 
picnic was officially named the "Military March." Although 
national security against the bellicose communists of North 
Korea was always the excuse of oppression, that was 
actually a measure for staying in power by terrifying the 
people.
The Korean curricular field in this period was 
obviously swayed by the theories of the structure of the 
discipline. Among those theorists, R. S. Peters(1966) and 
P. H. Hirst(1965) contributed not only to justifying 
Bruner's theory of the structure of the discipline but also 
to reconsidering what had been regarded as granted. 
Similarly to Dewey, Peters and Hirst showed, using ordinary 
language analysis, that the current concept of education, 
and therefore curriculum as a means to an end, was wrong. 
They began to denounce the theory of extrinsic values in 
education which undergirded the Tyler-Bloom-Mager rationale
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and to arouse sympathy, mainly from some professors in 
colleges and departments of education, for education as its 
own end.
At the same time, some dissident teachers began to be 
expelled from schools because of the content they had 
taught in classrooms, and they formed an important anti- 
government group. They started, as a plausible reaction to 
the expulsion, to study political, especially Marxist, 
theories of education, particularly those of P. Freire, M. 
Carnoy, L. Althusser, M. Sarup and K. Harris. This was 
plausible because there seemed to be no better theory than 
those of Marxists to explain the political {and 
educational) situation in Korea and, moreover, to suggest a 
solution, namely a revolution. For a good example,
Freire's Pedagogy of the Oppressed {1970) had long been a 
banned book but was read widely among radical teachers and 
scholars, and his concept of "conscientization" became a 
common word describing "teaching something anti- 
governmental or anti-capitalistic, therefore communist."
1.7. Period of Humanistic Curriculum (1981-1995)
Park's autocratic government, which had been in power 
for almost two decades, collapsed as the chief of the
Korean C.I.A. assassinated the President on October 26, 
1979. In spite of the Korean people's bursting expectation 
and demand for a freer society and for the civilian 
democracy which had been restrained so far, a group of 
generals who were afraid of losing their vested privilege 
carried out another military coup d'etat, killing hundreds 
of innocent civilians in May 1980.
As had usually been the case, the national curriculum 
was revised once again in the next year after the new 
government started. This time the new curriculum claimed 
to be humanistic. One or two school hours per week were 
reduced, and extracurricular activities were emphasized in 
order to normalize the management of school curriculum by 
relieving students from the excessive burden of preparation 
for college entrance examinations. Integrated subjects 
were also introduced into the primary schools. However, 
students, especially high school students, were to stay at 
school almost until midnight under the name of "autonomous 
classes" or "compensatory classes," and the extracurricular 
activities were never conducted outside school. At the 
same time, the government strictly banned private tutoring 
which had long been a social problem because of its high
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cost and hence its availability only for the rich. The 
risk increased the cost, and secret tutoring became a 
lucrative job in Korea. As a result, the overall 
expenditure of private tutoring became bigger than that of 
the regular schooling (Kong and Chun, 1990). From this 
time on, colleges were forced to reflect applicants' high 
school grades in their selection of the students.
The sanguinary coup in 1980, on the other hand, made 
the dissident groups, especially those composed of student 
activists, more violent and more biased to Marxist 
theories. Anti-Americanism began to appear openly in 
students' demonstrations after this coup, which was finally 
acknowledged by the U.S. government officials who had, as 
before, preferred autocracy to "instability" in the Korean 
peninsula. Dissidents were no longer afraid of the 
government's oppressive power, and anti-government riots 
more frequently burst out. In the same way, comparatively 
young scholars and professors in academic circles did not 
conceal their interests in radical social theories. Thus, 
such jargon as "neo-colonial monopoly capitalism" has been 
used to define the nature of Korean society {Park and Cho, 
1989) .
In the field of education, a British version of the 
New Sociology of Education and the Conflict Theory from the 
U.S. were introduced into Korea. The New Sociology 
stimulated the Korean educationalists' taken-for-granted 
view of curriculum, while Jean Anyon's study into the 
American History textbooks (1979) was often quoted to 
reveal distorted ideological reflection in curriculum.
Some of Michael Apple's books were translated into Korean. 
Some curricular theorists began to raise fundamental 
questions about the usefulness and validity of the Tyler- 
Bloom-Mager rationale (Lee, 1982) .
It was in this period that W. Pinar's reconceptualist 
curriculum theory (1981) was introduced as an alternative 
approach to the traditional taken-for-granted view of 
curriculum (Kwak, 1981; Lee, 1983). In his effort to 
classify curricular researches imported to Korea into some 
categories, Lee (1983) pointed out the looseness of the 
term "reconceptualist," and he broke Pinar's 
reconceptualists into two separate camps: those who had 
Marxist or political backgrounds and those who showed more 
humanistic interest focusing on the individual. Pinar's 
study also made some Korean curricularists reconsider the
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nature of curriculum itself, which had been only an
administrative significance. However, Pinar's
phenomenological and autobiographical emphases were so 
unfamiliar to the Korean curricularists that many were not 
illuminated as to his broader interest in reconceptualizing 
the curriculum field.
Inspired by an expanding atmosphere of more freedom in 
overall society on the one hand and in intellectual circles 
on the other, some teachers tried to organize the Teachers' 
Labor Union in the mid-1980s. Their theoretical support 
was mainly provided by the teachers who had been expelled 
from their schools and who had been fascinated by the 
political educational theory since the 1970s. Some of the
parents showed an aversion to the word "laborer" which
seemed to identify their children's teachers with the 
"vulgar" manual laborer and the government was able to 
criminalize the movement. More than 1,500 young teachers 
who refused to secede from the Union were fired and formed 
an important dissident group. Although some of the initial 
activists among the teachers were excessively biased toward 
Marxist theories of education as a reaction to the 
prohibition of Marxist theories of any kind, their on-the-
spot experience enabled them to make many practical 
researches, and they began to publish a series of critiques 
of the content of the textbooks and classroom knowledge 
{Union of Association of Subject Teachers, 1989; Teachers 
Association for Korean Language and Literature Education, 
1988, 1989a, 1989b, 1990; Teachers Association for Moral 
and Ethics Education, 1989; Teachers Association for 
History Education, 1989; English Teachers Association,
1991; Department of Subject in Teachers Union of Korea, 
1990; Association of Korean Language and Literature 
Teachers in Chung-Nam Province, 1988).
"Open education," which had been introduced into Korea 
with A. S. Neil's Summerhill School, was also revitalized 
as another possible alternative to the uniform national 
curriculum. Since it is too early to evaluate the result 
of the movement which is still in an experimental stage in 
about 10 schools, it would be sufficient for the present to 
value the teachers' voluntariness and enthusiasm to respect 
students' individual differences, creativity, and autonomy 
in spite of the prevailing uniform curriculum.
The military training as a required class, which had 
been a symbol of both authoritative policy of education and
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the partitioned state of the country, was abolished in this 
period and will be eliminated from the high-school 
curriculum in 1995. The content justifying government 
power has been removed from so-called policy subjects.
In 1993, the new President Y. Kim was inaugurated, and 
a "civilian" government has been launched. Because he is 
the first President who has not been from the military 
since 1961, many people look forward to a more democratic 
and free society. In 1994, most of the teachers who had 
been fired because of the Union Movement returned to their 
schools, giving up the Union but not its ideals. The 
future finally may be "open."
1.8. Summary and Review
One of the most noticeable features in the history of 
curricular reform in Korea is that the reforms always 
followed major changes in the political situation. This is 
especially conspicuous after 1945. In other words, those 
who seized the political power always needed the reform of 
the national curriculum in order both to include the 
content justifying the process of taking the power and to 
accord the curriculum to the contemporary educational and 
curricular theories that had been introduced into Korea.
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Every national curriculum since 1945 was the result of the 
subtle, sometimes very odd, combination of these two 
purposes, producing situations where it has not been easy 
to distinguish which one of these two purposes was the 
prior.
Consequently, official curriculum policy could not 
help being authoritarian, and control of the central 
government over planning and managing the curriculum was 
almost inevitable. There has been no room for teachers, 
students, parents, and even curricular theorists, whose 
roles were not neglected so completely even in the Tyler 
rationale, the most influential model for the Korean 
curriculum.
Thus, the Korean national curriculum has been most, 
vulnerable to Marxist criticism, such as K. Harris's work, 
namely that curriculum is used as a major means to present 
"a distorted view of the world," and to offer "a 
misrepresentation of reality" {1979, p. 164) . This line of 
political critique about education and curriculum was so 
flourishing in the mid-1980s that few dared to point out 
its weakness, afraid of being stigmatized as conservative. 
However, as many scholars have properly indicated, these
political theories of education and curriculum have been 
successful in raising problems but have failed in offering 
solutions to the problems. Especially in Korea, the harsh 
political condition has made some intellectuals biased 
toward radical political theories, which posed rather than 
eliminated many problems.
More than twenty years ago, a curricular theorist 
symbolized the history of Korean curricula since 1945 as a 
period of objectives model. He diagnosed rote learning and 
teaching as a major malignant symptom of the Korean 
education and pointed out that the symptom grew from the 
fact that the objectives model was widely held by teachers 
and educationalists. He proposed a content model as an 
alternative (Lee, 1977); this idea was obviously inspired 
by Peters, Hirst and Bruner, and was not very different 
from L. Stenhouse's (1975) "process model." Although he 
suggested, leaving aside political or Marxist concerns, 
that Korean teachers and educationists alter the concept of 
curriculum itself, many problems still remain unsettled, 
problems inherent in the objectives and content models of 
curriculum.
Another distinctive feature of the Korean curriculum 
through its history is that it has continuously been 
influenced by foreign theories. It was altogether 
instituted by foreigners even after the foundation of the 
country; since the introduction of modern education, the 
Western theories especially have exerted a great impact on 
the theory and practice of the Korean curriculum. Thus, 
the lack of indigenous and idiosyncratic theories and 
practices of curriculum has been frequently mentioned as 
one of the problems in the Korean education. As a possible 
reaction to this, some radicalists sought a way of 
liberating the Korean curriculum from the Western, 
particularly American influence. It was also in the mid- 
1980s that North Korean President Il-Sung Kim's version of 
nationalism, "Idea of Self-Reliance," was introduced to the 
young radicalist underground. This effort, however, 
sometimes showed a very chauvinistic tendency and raised 
other important questions regading curriculum: Can and 
should there be indigenous or nationalistic curriculum?
Can one be indigenous without being nationalistic or 
chauvinistic?
On the other hand, from the curriculum revised in 
1987, the government accepted the concept of local 
curriculum in order to break down the uniformity which has 
been pointed out as the major cause of the curricular 
problems in Korea. This concept of localization has 
further developed to become the most important 
characteristic of the new curriculum which will be 
implemented in 1995. Although the new policy appears to be 
more democratic and very timely in this postmodern era, 
this concept of localization provides grounds for its own 
questions and disputes.
CHAPTER TWO
THE NEW LOCALIZED CURRICULUM {1995 - )
At the end of 1992, the Korean government prepared a 
new national curriculum, which is to be implemented in 
1995. The government alleged that it had tried to "resolve 
the uniformity, rigidity, and closedness that had been 
frequently pointed out as major problems of the Korean 
curriculum by decentralizing the right to decide the 
content of education and enlarging range of autonomous 
discretion of schools and local authorities of education" 
(The Ministry of Education, 1992a, p. 6). Although there 
are some other points the Ministry publicized that it had 
placed emphasis on in the process of the revision, such as 
education for democratic citizenship or cultivation of 
creativity, these are not very different from the slogans 
that appeared whenever the curriculum was revised. Thus, 
this new curriculum is called localized curriculum.
Because the most salient, and perhaps most notorious, 
feature of the Korean curriculum has been an authoritative 
government control over the uniform curriculum, as was 
indicated in the prior chapter, the new localized
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curriculum is an attempt to solve many problems of Korean 
education and curriculum, at least to solve the uniformity, 
rigidity, and closedness, as the Ministry intends.
However, the new curriculum is not very promising in 
solving the vexing problems of the Korean curriculum not 
only because it prescribes localization as a solution 
without altering the concept of curriculum itself but also 
because the new curriculum is not as much localized as it 
appears.
2.1. The Concept of Localization in the New Curriculum
A document published by the Ministry of Education 
shows that "the decentralization of curriculum decision­
making" (1992a, 1992b) is a core point of the revision.
So, localization means officially that the central 
government decentralizes the right of curriculum decision­
making to local educational authorities and school units, 
and ultimately to the teacher.
Under centralized curriculum policy, the central 
government develops and mandates the whole curriculum. 
"Desirable human nature" or "educational aims" are usually 
prepared before the curriculum is developed, and curriculum 
is identified with the contents which are selected and
organized in order to achieve these aims and objectives 
most effectively. Curriculum is looked upon as a means to 
an end. The teacher's role is to produce by means of 
curriculum the desirable human nature out of raw material, 
that is, the student. Teachers are forced to teach 
predetermined content provided to them in a document called 
"curriculum" in predetermined ways. From the viewpoint of 
the superior offices, such as the Ministry and the local 
educational authorities, teachers are no more than 
technicians who apply the predetermined curriculum to 
students. Those teachers who reflect seriously on why, 
what and how to teach become problem teachers. Not only 
curriculum but also teachers and students become means to 
an end.
On the other hand, decentralized curriculum policy 
attributes all the responsibilities and rights regarding 
curriculum development and management to the teacher's 
role. Under this policy, teachers are no longer the 
objects of supervising by the superior offices and, 
extremely speaking, can teach whatever they want to. Many 
of the problems inherent in centralized curriculum policy 
can be resolved {Kwak, 1989, pp. 165-166): First, the
teacher could escape from the role of mere deliverer. 
Second, students' differences, local particularities, and 
different educational views can be reflected in the 
curriculum. Third, such democratic characters as openness 
and forebearance can be developed. Fourth, education and 
teachers will no longer be regarded as means to an end. 
However, economy and efficiency that are characteristic of 
centralized curriculum policy will be decreased 
considerably. In addition, because there will be no such 
notion as prespecified content to be taught, the teacher 
can and should decide what and how to teach by him- or 
herself. Thus, the teacher’s job-related burden will be so 
heavy that there is a danger that incompetent teachers 
could teach anything.
Localization in the new Korean curriculum also has 
another meaning, that of "understanding of the student's 
own province by curricularizing various information about 
the local history, geography, economy, culture and current 
events, or by using it" (Inn, 1988, p. 13). This 
geographical notion of localization is called "cultures of 
learning argument" by Weiler (1993, p. 57), which argues 
that localization "can provide greater sensitivity to local
variations" (Weiler, p. 64) or "[can adapt] the educational 
efforts to local conditions, both in terms of local 
economic activities, and in terms of knowledge and 
understanding of the special characteristics of the local 
region" (Weiler, p. 64). This concept of localization has 
already been introduced into the Korean national curriculum 
since 1987, as shown at the end of the prior chapter. In 
Social Studies in the primary school, "Life of Our City and 
Province" is suggested as a localized unit. In the new 
curriculum, on the other hand, an optional course hour in 
the primary school and an elective subject in the secondary 
school can be used as a localized unit. The optional 
course of the primary school can be used "either as a 
supplementary or enrichment class of a regular subject or 
as a creative educational activity class depending on the 
unique educational needs of schools or the demand of 
students." In either case, "directions from local 
educational authorities should be observed" (The Ministry 
of Education, 1992a, p. 18). The elective subject of the 
secondary school is one of those subjects such as Chinese 
Characters, Computer, Environment, or other necessary 
subjects (for the Middle School) and one among Philosophy,
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Logic, Psychology, Education, Everyday Economics, Religion, 
Environmental Science, or other necessary subjects (for the 
High School). One of these other subjects can be a 
localized subiect, complying with directions of local 
educational authorities (p. 44).
However, considering the current situation of Korean 
education, it is not probable that both primary and 
secondary schools will select a localized class for the 
optional course or the elective subject. It is more 
probable that the optional course of the primary school 
will be used as a supplementary or compensatory class to 
regular classes, which will be more easily managed than 
designing an entirely new (localized) class. For the 
secondary school also, the situation will be the same 
because selecting one among the given subjects as an 
elective will be much easier, consequently more feasible, 
than creating a whole new subject, which will necessarily 
require extra research and efforts from staffs and teachers 
of the school whose primary concern will be college 
entrance examinations. Moreover, despite its meaning and 
validity as "a means of recognizing and accommodating the 
diversity and importance of different cultural environments
in one society" (Weiler, 1993, p. 66), the diversity and 
difference do not seem to be significant enough to 
influence the whole curriculum of general education in a 
small and homogeneous country like Korea. For instance, 
according to research about the educational needs of the 
Korean people (Chin et al., 1989, pp. 98-99), there is 
almost no difference in the kinds of educational needs 
among the people according to their place of birth and 
residence. The result may be a reflection of the Korean 
people's homogeneity in ethnicity, culture and language. 
Schubert (1991) admits that "if the society is rather 
homogeneous, differences by locale would be diminished 
considerably and curriculum goals would be centralized by 
default" (p. 105). Although Pinar (1991) suggests, 
analyzing Southerners' "presentism," the significance of 
place or locale in curriculum, to lay the same emphasis on 
the Korean curriculum, especially on curriculum for general 
education seems to be almost impossible. The impossibility 
might come from the significance of the place called Korea 
that has homogeneous race, culture, and language, unlike 
the United States of which heterogeneity is one of the most 
important characterisitcs.
Thus, by the concept of localization, the Ministry 
seems to be placing emphasis on decentralization of the 
right of curriculum decision-making rather than on 
geographic localization of curriculum content. The level 
of decentraliztion, nevertheless, shows that the new 
curriculum is not at all as decentralized as it appears.
2.2. The Level of Localization
The level of localization or decentralization of the 
curriculum decision-making could be varied according to 
what extent the central government relinquishes its power. 
Hannaway and Carnoy (1993) distinguish decentralization 
into three levels: system-level decentralization 
(decentralizing decision-making from national to local 
jurisdiction), organization-level decentralization 
(decentralizing decision-making from central authorities to 
school-level actors), and market decentralization 
(decentralizing decision-making to parents) (pp. xi-xii).
It is also possible to categorize the levels into two 
(Kwak, 1989): the active level or localizing enactment of 
curriculum in which local authorities and schools have the 
right to decide and legislate their own curriculum, and the 
passive level or localizing management of curriculum in
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which local authorities and schools restructure and manage 
national curriculum in accordance with the specific 
circumstances of a province and a school (p. 166).
In the new curriculum for the primary and the middle 
school, the right of decision making in curriculum is not 
more decentralized than in the prior curriculum. But in 
the high school curriculum, the right of designing and 
implementing curriculum appears to be relinquished 
considerably to local educational authorities and schools. 
This change is so revolutionary that no such policy can be 
seen in the prior curricular revisions since 1945. Until 
the present curriculum, the Ministry of Education has 
regulated the subjects, class hours for them, and the grade 
year when those subjects should be taught for all kinds of 
high schools. In the new curriculum, on the other hand, 
the Ministry designates 70 units of compulsory subjects out 
of 188 units that the high school student should complete 
in three school years (a unit means a class hour per week 
in a semester). Local educational authorities and 
individual schools decide 106 units and 12 units each.
Statistically seen, these figures might be seen as 
representing a dramatic decentralization of curriculum
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decision-making, like one that corresponds to Hannaway and 
Carnoy's system- or organization-level decentralization and 
Kwak's active level of localization. However, numbers, 
figures, or statistics show nothing real in this case as in 
other numerous cases. The right of local educational 
authorities and schools to select the content of education 
is virtually blocked because the Ministry still specifies 
the subjects, out of which the electives should be 
selected. The 106 units that local authorities can decide 
for the academic (not vocational) high school, for example, 
should be selected from 53 subjects, whose properties, 
objectives, and outlined contents are specified by the 
Ministry. Instructional and evaluational emphases in every 
subject are also prescribed.
Thus, the substance of decision-making that the 
Ministry decentralized does not include the right to select 
contents for the curriculum but only to select subjects out 
of the given number of subjects. This is not at all the 
decentralization of curriculum decision-making about which 
Hannaway and Carnoy are writing, but at the most, only the 
passive level of localization in Kwak's word.
From the perspective of teachers who will actually 
manage the curriculum, therefore, the localization or 
decentralization which has been so highlighted as a new 
feature of the new Korean curriculum will not have any 
significance. It is not different from the prior 
organizations. Moreover, the Ministry inherits textbook 
policy of the colonial period, that is, to publish 
textbooks of so-called policy subjects such as Korean 
Language and Literature, Social Life, National Ethics, and 
Korean History of secondary schools and all textbooks for 
primary schools and to inspect and approve others. Because 
the objectives, content, and instructional and evaluational 
emphases of all the subjects are prescribed in the form of 
a law by the Ministry as forementioned, virtually all the 
textbooks are published by the central government. This 
policy of curriculum and textbook design is applied to all 
primary and secondary schools, no matter how they were 
established, privately or publicly. Under these 
circumstances, teachers do not need to be concerned about 
the curricular matters. All they have to do is to conduct 
their classes as they did: to deliver the prescribed 
textbook knowledge in a prescribed way. They have been
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identifying textbooks as curriculum, and this (mis-) 
identification will continue until the revision of the 
Article 155(1) of Education Law: "Curriculum shall be 
decided by the Ministry of Education."
Mayors and governors of local cities and provinces who 
have been appointed by the central government will be 
elected by the inhabitants' vote in the same year the new 
curriculum will be applied. Local legislative assemblies 
were already constructed a few years ago. Habermas (1975) 
has defined this decentralization of political power as a 
process of compensating "legitimation crisis" and Weiler 
(1993) uses Habermas's concept to explain the central 
government's relinquishment of control over education. 
Considering the overall trend of decentralization of the 
governmental power in Korea, the new localized curriculum 
seems to be an obvious means of compensatory legitimation 
of the central government's authority. But actual control 
over curriculum decision-making is under command of the 
central government, and the following quotation of Weiler 
explains the situation: "Decentralization and community 
participation are frequently just a model to which it is 
fashionable to pay lip service" (p. 64).
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2.3. Centralization vs. Localization in the United States
When speaking about curriculum policy of the western 
countries, the United States is frequently exemplified as 
having decentralized curriculum policy while France has a 
very centralized system (Chin et al., pp. 45-66). 
Considering that the Constitution of the United States does 
not mention education, that the federal government does not 
have other means of exercising control over state 
educational systems (Spring, 1994, p. 194), and that the 
country does not have a national curriculum like that of 
Korea, it could be true that curriculum decision-making in 
the United Staes is decentralized. However, almost all the 
materials about the United States' curriculum policy point 
out the federal government's direct influence on curriculum 
decision through, for example, persuasion, categorical aid, 
civil rights legislation, and research funding (Spring,
1994, p. 212). Despite the growing influence, especially 
since the 1980s, on curriculum decision-making of the 
federal government, it is still the state that holds the 
final obligatory responsibility for education and 
curriculum.
At the state level, the control of curriculum 
decision-making is expressed through state constitutional 
provisions, legislative acts, state board or department of 
education requirements, and financial provisions. In 
general, the state designates subjects to be taught, 
graduation requirements, time allotments, and special 
programs and emphases. Curriculum decisions made at the 
state level control and restrict local curriculum decision­
making in other areas as well. Specific accreditation 
requirements control such curriculum policies as extra­
class activities, organization of classes, library and 
other resources. State examination systems, supervision 
and inspection rights, accountability requirements, and 
legislative investigations contribute to inhibiting local 
innovation and experimentation (Spring, 1993, 1994; Klein, 
1991; Doll, 1986). Their effect is one of regulation, and 
their influence on local curriculum decision-making is 
"great" (Peretz, 1981, p. 47). Due to the political and 
cultural environments of the United States, control over 
curriculum hardly shows itself as a requirement for uniform 
curriculum which can be found in Korea. It sometimes takes 
rather indirect and insinuating forms such as "no-pass, no-
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drive" laws or high school graduation as a requirement for 
getting off welfare, which foreign researchers of American 
curriculum tend to overlook very easily in studying 
curriculum control in the United States.
Thus seen, curriculum policy of the United States can 
not be said to be purely decentralized. Schubert (1991) 
points out that "today curriculum is controlled at the 
state level more than ever before in American history " (p. 
98), and Phipo (1991) categorizes 23 states into 
decentralized states in curriculum policy and 21 states 
into centralized states (p. 77). The history of American 
education also shows that curriculum policy has been the 
result of the agreement of the various interest groups and 
that neither one of curriculum policy, centralized or 
decentralized, has been the penetrating one through history 
(Kliebard, 1986; Spring, 1994; Schubert, 1991).
The curriculum field did not begin as a field at all. Unlike 
educational psychology, philosophy of education and sociology of 
education, the field of curriculum did not originate as an 
extension or application of an extant discipline. Rather, the 
field is usually said to have begun in Denver in the 1920s as a 
result of administrative 'need'...This origin is very important 
in understanding why the American curriculum field developed as 
it did, and why it is undergoing what is now undergoing. (Pinar 
and Grumet, 1981, p. 20)
The cyclical nature, or "the pendulum swing 
phenomenon" in Kliebard's term (1992, p. 104), of pros and
cons of argument for centralized or decentralized 
curriculum decision-making in the United States seems to be 
related to the origin of curriculum itself, which can be 
found in the quotation above. As its administrative and 
managerial nature in origin suggests, American curriculum 
policy has been largely influenced more by the societal and 
political milieu than academic theories of curriculum in 
ways that propitiate collective consciousness of the 
American people of the time, which Schwab would deplore as 
not "practical" (Westbury and Wilkof, 1978, Chs. 10-12) . 
Thus, Elmore (1993) maintains that "debates about 
centralization in American education are mainly debates 
about who should have access to and influence over 
decisions, not about what the content and practice of 
teaching and learning should be and how to change those 
things" (p. 40), and that this is why the debates have 
influenced little to the teaching practice of teachers.
Although Franklin argues that social control over 
curriculum has not disappeared but "muted" (in Pinar, 1988, 
p. 89) , it seems to have never been muted. Especially 
since the 1980s, this control has been so loud that legal 
decisions and legislation toward centralized curriculum,
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both at the national and the state level, have been 
increased continuously. But these tendencies to centralize 
curriculum decision-making do not seem always to aggravate 
teachers and local authorites. Hannaway's distinction of 
"social" from "bureaucratic" processes (1993, p. 152) in 
curriculum control is very suggestive in this respect.
Social control, by definition, requires interaction. It is the 
process by which individual behavior is affected by the 
informational and normative influence of others, (p. 152)
If control of curriculum is a social one, teachers do not 
feel unduly restricted by curriculum policies even when 
they do not actually participate in curriculum decision­
making .
Curriculum decision-making in the United States, thus 
seen, does not seem to be controlled as bureaucratically as 
the Korean curriculum, although it is not a completely 
decentralized one.
2.4. Centralization vs. Decentralization in England
Another often quoted example, at least until 1988, of 
a decentralized curriculum system in which teachers decide 
on their curriculum was that of England.
Teachers in England are often said to be much more 'free' than 
teachers in other parts of the world, particularly in their 
freedom to decide what to teach. There is no centrally imposed 
curriculum for schools. (Lawton, 1978, p. 1)
England has been said to have a "national educational 
system locally administered" (Jones, 1985, p. 27). Until 
1833, there was little problem about central control of the 
curriculum because the government had deliberately avoided 
financial involvement (Lawton, 1980, p. 13). Since the 
second half of the 19th century, however, a conflict has 
developed between those who, in general, hold the 
philosophy of laissez-faire and those who want some kinds 
of limited government intervention. By the 1944 Education 
Act, all regulations that limited teachers' control of the 
curriculum disappeared due to the united resistance of 
teachers. The only subject the 1944 Act regulated to be 
taught in schools in England was religious education 
(Jones, 1985, p. 44) . Thus, after 1945, schools were free 
to embark upon any kind of curriculum the teachers chose to 
offer.
Although the central government had sometimes tried to 
gain some control of curriculum, the effort had not been 
successful until 1988. Good examples were failures of the 
imposition of five-subject School Certificate examination 
in 1950-51 (Lawton, 1980, p. 21) and of the attempt to set 
up a national curriculum agency - The Curriculum Study
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Group - under the government control in 1964 (Jones, 1985, 
p. 46) . The School Certificate Examination had to give way 
to the New General Certificate of Education (GCE) single­
subject Ordinary Level examination, and the attempt to 
construct a curriculum agency ended up with the Schools 
Council being dominated not by the government but by 
teacher representatives.
In 1976, Prime Minister Callaghan questioned whether 
schools and the education service generally were doing 
enough to provide the industrial society with sufficient 
training in the basic subjects, which initiated the so- 
called Great-Debates afterwards (Lawton, 1980, pp. 24-25; 
Jones, 1985, pp. 26-27) . These Great Debates, obviously 
the same kind as the debates in the United States after A 
Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, 1983), The Closing of the American Mind (Bloom, 
A., 1987), and Cultural Literacy (Hirsch, 1987), brought 
forth the Education Reform Act of 1988.
According to the Act of 1988, the National Curriculum 
is mandatory and statutory (Dufour, 1990) . The ten defined 
subjects, the foundation subjects -- English, Mathematics, 
Science, Modern Language, History, Geography, Technology,
Music, Art and Physical Education -- occupy the majority of 
the timetable, leaving some place, but not much, for 
additional subjects to be chosen by schools and teachers, 
in consultation with governors. In addition, students1 
attainment in National Curriculum subjects is to be tested 
at 7, 11, 14 and 16 years of age.
Although this "revolutionary" reform is a result of 
more broad social demands such as efficiency of education, 
teacher accountability, economic competitiveness, and basic 
skills as well as then Prime Minister Thatcher's 
charismatic leadership {Mclean and Voskrensenskaya, 1992, 
p. 75), there has been a long history of arguments for 
clearer central guidelines for curriculum (Hirst, 1978; 
Hirst and Peters, 1970; Holt, 1978; White, 1973; Becher and 
Maclure, 1978) . But all those who have advocated a common 
curriculum do not seem to be delighted to accept it.
White, for example, criticizes it as "not helpful" because 
of a lack of educational aims (pp. 9-14). Statements of 
rationale are so ambiguous, he argues, that a tyrant like 
Hitler or Stalin would accept these as statements of their 
educational aims. Besides, the ten foundation subjects are 
almost identical to the ones Stalin had and the three core
subjects - language, mathematics and science - were also 
named as "important subjects" by Stalin. Mclean and 
Voskrensenskaya (1992) declare that it "failed in the long 
term" (p. 72) because it was an educational revolution from 
above, in the same way Gorbachev's perestroika in the 
Soviet Union failed because it was from above. Ball and 
Bowe (1992) argue that the present developments regarding 
the Act "are not resulting in a curricular provision that 
is driven by the market, but a provision that is driven by 
serendipity, ad hocery chaos and the minimum planning that 
such circumstances allow" and that "the cost of all this 
within schools is measured by teachers' stress, resentment, 
illness, absenteeism and the number of those leaving the 
profession" (p. 98) . Furthermore, they see the Act, from 
an obvious hermeneutical view, as a text and argue that the 
state control model is analytically very limited because 
the authors of the National Curriculum are limited in their 
capacity to control the meanings embedded in the texts; as 
a result, such texts are read and appreciated differently 
in different settings (P. 113).
However, according to another report (Cox, Evans and 
Sanders, 1992), teachers' attitudes towards the National
Curriculum are not so negative. Generally, they view the 
attainment tests negatively but think the National 
Curriculum will not seriously deprive the classroom teacher 
of professional freedom and scope for initiative. They 
also do not consider the introduction of the National 
Curriculum as an educationally backward move.
One of the reasons that the teachers do not see the 
National Curriculum as a threat to their professionality 
seems to be the fact that the National Curriculum does not 
seize teachers' actual right regarding the curriculum 
content they have been possessing. Despite the fact that 
the foundation and core subjects in the National Curriculum 
may be strikingly similar to those of Stalin's curriculum 
or even to those of the Korean curriculum, those do not 
mean subject names by which schools actually teach 
students. There are no regulations, unlike the Korean 
curriculum, regarding time allotment or regarding subjects 
that should be taught in a particular grade or semester. 
Neither the Act nor the National Curriculum prescribes the 
objectives of the grade schools or of each subject. 
According to the National Curriculum Council:
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The use of subjects to define the National Curriculum does not 
mean that teaching has to be organized and delivered within 
prescribed subject boundaries. Subject descriptions reflect the 
way in which school curriculum is now most often planned and, in 
secondary schools, also organized (Ball and Bowe, 1952, p. 102) .
The actual right to organize and to implement curriculum in 
each school still remains in the hands of principals and 
teachers. In other words, from the teachers' standpoint, 
nothing much has changed in what and how to teach, except 
the attainment tests. This has been also foreseen by a 
study right before the Act:
The prognosis, however, is that British schools in the 1990s 
will be very similar institutions to those around today and that 
the curriculum will also appear very similar. (Jones, 1985, p.
48)
The Act grants individual schools a right to demand 
funds directly from the central government so that the 
right of local educational authorities is considerably 
weakened and that of schools and parents enforced. The 
main concern of the British National Curriculum seems to 
be, in the end, in the attainment tests rather than in what 
to teach and, borrowing Elmore's and Weiler's terms, in 
securing the government’s share of power in access to 
curriculum decision without jeopardizing their
legitimation.
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2.5. Centralization vs. Decentralization Revisited
From the examples of the United States and England, 
debates about centralization and decentralization have been . 
shown to be centered mostly around administrative hegemony, 
not around what should actually be taught in concrete 
classrooms, and thus have little influence on teaching 
practice. Although curriculum policies of these two 
countries can not be said to be completely decentralized, 
teachers in these countries, unlike Korean teachers, appear 
to have some extent of autonomy in deciding what and how to 
teach. No matter to what degree the central power over the 
curriculum policy is decentralized, however, actual 
classroom practices tend to remain largely the same, as has 
been frequently pointed out. This is, and will likely be, 
the case for the new Korean curriculum, too. Even if the 
level of decentralization or localization in the new Korean 
curriculum has been proved to be far behind that of the 
United States and England, actual influence of the 
curriculum policy on classroom practice is not so great. 
Speaking more concretely, science teachers in England under 
the new centralized curriculum policy and those in Korea 
under the new localized policy may not have to be
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distressed about what and how to teach, nor they must fear 
lest the time-tables in schools should disappear suddenly.
From a Foucauldian view, debates about centralization 
and decentralization which have been provided so far are 
themselves meaningless, or at least stale, because power no 
longer centers around the .State. Aiming obviously at such 
Marxists as Althusser (1971), Foucault (1980) categorizes 
the way power is exercised only in terms of the State 
apparatus as "juridical" (p. 115). He suggests another 
frame of power analysis; that is power-knowledge. This 
concept of power-knowledge decentralizes the State from the 
center of discourses regarding power and overcomes the 
State-people dichotomy in power relations.
We should abandon a whole tradition that allows us to imagine 
that knowledge can exist only where the power relations are 
suspended and that knowledge can develop only outside its 
injunctions, its demands and its interests...We should admit 
rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by 
encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because 
it is useful)? that power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that 
does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power 
relations. (Foucault, 1979a, pp. 94-95)
According to him, knowledge is developed by the exercise of 
power and is used in turn to legitimate further exercise of
power.
School is most frequently articulated by Foucault as 
an institution of govemmentalization, which he uses to 
analyze complex power relations in the modern 
industrialized society. Instead of violent and brutal 
exercise of power, the new and gentle methods of 
discipline, "not to punish less, but to punish better" 
(1979a, p. 82), have emerged in order to produce docile 
bodies. School is one of those gentle and "caring" 
institutions, along with the prison, hospital, asylum, 
military, and work place, within which knowledge has been 
developed, refined, and used to shape individuals in more 
elaborate and fine ways.
What makes teachers' classroom practices remain 
unchanged, especially regarding the content, in spite of 
centralized or decentralized curriculum policy? Why do 
teachers teach nothing too much differently from what the 
central or state governments, or more generally, people of 
the society want to them to?
Answering these questions, Foucault's approach seems 
to be very useful. While Cherryholmes (1988) tries to 
explain why reform attempts, such as the efforts to 
centralize curriculum in the United States, do not usually
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have much influence on the actual teacher's classroom using 
a Foucauldian approach, his explanation overlooks 
Foucault's insight into power-knowledge relations.
The immense size, complexity, and decentralized nature of 
American education mitigates against quickly instituted, 
enduring changes. Foucault's approach to discursive practices 
provides a likely characterization of American education as an 
anonymous, powerful, slowly changing discourse that we inherit 
and over which we have little control. {Cherryholms, 1988, p.
135)
Cherryholmes seems to be right in pointing out that we 
have little control over an anonymous and powerful 
discourse that is a product of power-knowledge 
relationship, but he fails to explain more concretely that 
the teacher's own professionality or specialty itself is a 
product of power and that the teacher or his/her own 
subject itself implies power. The teacher usually thinks 
that his/her own field of knowledge is outside power 
relations and that his/her profession is to teach this 
knowledge to the student regardless of the changes of 
curriculum policy. Thus, the teacher shows no serious 
interest in the changes of curriculum policy as far as it 
does not infringe his/her professionality - to teach 
his/her own professionalized knowledge as a fixed 
knowledge.
Historically, the general content of education has 
been justified under various names such as disciplines, 
subjects, forms of knowledge, or basics by J. Bruner 
(1959), H. Broudy (1964), P. Phenix (1964), and J. Schwab 
(1964) in the United States and R. Peters (1970), P. Hirst 
(1970), and J. White (1973) in England. In this process, 
as Cherryholmes indicates, invoking Derridean 
deconstructionism, disciplinary structure became a 
transcendental signified for curriculum (p. 13 9) . A 
teacher usually has one's own field or subject and thinks 
s/he is "specialized" or "professionalized" in that 
discipline. But s/he hardly recognizes that 
professionalization of knowledge is a form of a discipline 
to create "docile bodies" which may be subjected, used, 
transformed and improved. To quote Foucault again, there 
is no power relation without the correlative constitution 
of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations. 
Time-tables, classifications, and examinations which do not 
seem to disappear in schools, regardless of which 
curriculum policy, centralized or decentralized, they take, 
are also other major examples Foucault refers to directly
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as methods to discipline docile bodies (1979a, pp. 149,
181, 184).
Thus, it is no more than an illusion for the teacher 
to think that all s/he must do is to teach his or her 
"professionalized" and "politically neutralized" knowledge 
regardless of the changes in curriculum policy. It is also 
an illusion for the teacher to think that s/he can produce 
his or her own discourse and become a "subject" under a 
decentralized (from the State or a political power) 
curriculum policy because discourse produces the subject,' 
not vice versa. Under a decentralized and individualized 
curriculum policy, it might seem to be possible that the 
teacher can be an autonomous subject and can produce 
autonomous subjects. However, for Foucault, not only 
totalizing but also individualizing forms of power are used 
("a double bind"; 1983, p. 216) as technologies of 
producing docile bodies.
At the local level, of course, there is often a high degree of 
conscious decision making, planning, plotting and coordination 
of political activity. Foucault refers to this as ''the local 
cynicism of power"...The fact that individuals make decisions 
about specific policies or particular groups jockey for their 
own advantage does not mean that overall activation and 
directionality of power relations in a society implies a 
subject. (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 187)
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He suggests individualization is maximal for the upper 
regions of power in a feudal society: the more power or 
privilege one holds, the more one is marked out as an 
individual. In a disciplinary rigime, on the other hand, 
individualization is descendant: to the extent that power 
itself becomes more anonymous and functional, those on whom 
it is exercised tend to be the more strongly individualized 
(Foucault, 1979a, pp. 192-194).
Foucault describes the school as a blockage of 
capacity-communication-power (1983, p. 218) . The school is 
an important part of society's regime of truth, that is, 
"the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function 
as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to 
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which 
each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded 
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who 
are charged with saying what counts as true" (1980, p.
131) .
The following description by Cherryholmes shows how 
regime of truth occurs actually in schools:
Educators speak as educators, for example, after becoming
proficient in their professional discourses. Certifiably so.
Following certification one is permitted or asked or compensated
69
to speak with authority on education. Such speakers, however, 
have no direct access to the origins of the discourses. (1988, 
p. 34)
Not only the teacher him- or herself is a docile body but 
s/he also creates docile bodies unless s/he comes awakened 
from his or her illusion that s/he can reach "the lost 
origin" {Foucault, 1977, p. 143) of his or her knowledge 
and unless s/he struggles against the regime of truth with 
which s/he engaged and within which s/he is constituted. 
This struggle should be not only against centralized power 
but also against decentralized or individualized power.
The conclusion would be that the political, ethical, social, 
philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the 
individual from the state, and from the state's institutions, 
but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of 
individualization which is linked to the state. We have to 
promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this 
kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)
As Dreyfus and Rabinow suggest (pp. 206-207), Foucault 
leaves to his readers questions about the concrete methods 
and strategies of liberation, resistance, or struggle. 
However, he clearly and frequently expresses his opposition 
to all kinds of universal and totalizing discourses; this 
permeates all his writings. For him, intellectual does not 
mean the "bearer of universal values" (1980, p. 132). 
Rather, it is the person occupying a specific position -
but whose specificity is linked to the general functioning 
of an apparatus of truth. Thus, the struggle must be local 
and specific. Only this local and specific struggle can 
have effects and implications which are not simply 
professional and sectoral. The intellectual can operate 
and struggle at the general level of that regime of truth 
which is so essential to the structure and functioning of 
our society.
Thus seen, the Foucauldian sense of localization is 
not just a relinquishment of power from the State but a 
struggle against all kinds of disciplinary discourses -- 
totalized or individualized, violent or gentle, blatant or 
subtle. This struggle is a role of intellectuals, thus of 
educators and teachers.
CHAPTER THREE
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPT OF LOCAL CURRICULUM
3.1. Foucauldian Locality and Local Struggle
In fact, the way that we should resist or struggle 
against the disciplinary power and the possibility of the 
resistance or struggle itself are not at all obvious in 
most of Foucault's writings. It may be because he is 
"notorious for his reluctance to make value judgements" 
{Kusch, 1991, p. 218} or because of his "ascetic refusal to 
go beyond his concrete demonstrations" (Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, 1983, p. 205). The concept of locality is not 
directly mentioned in the writings by and about Foucault. 
The concept of locality is usually presupposed tacitly as a 
main theme in the Foucauldian theory of power-knowledge, 
and it is also an important point at which Foucault's post­
structuralism is linked to postmodernism. As the word 
"post-structuralism" suggests, such key ideas as 
decentralization and difference are omnipresent in 
Foucault's thought.
First of all, for Foucault, the concept of power is 
decentralized from and non-reductive to the State, as
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described in the preceding chapter. Thus, a political 
change in modern history when capitalism emerged was not a 
transmission of power from the State to civil society but 
an increased governmentalization of power relations. He 
does not think of power in the sense of a unified state 
apparatus whose task is to ensure the subjection of the 
citizens of a particular society. Nor does he mean a 
general system of domination exerted by one group over 
another, the effect of which spreads to the whole society. 
Power should be understood as the multiplicity of power 
relations at work in a particular area of society. Power 
does not reside in some primary, central point. Power is 
ubiquitous because it is produced at every moment: "Power 
is everywhere... Power is not an institution, nor a 
structure, nor a possession. It is a name we give to a 
complex strategic situation in a particular society" 
(Foucault, 1979b, p. 93). In the process of 
governmentalization, which denotes the shift of power 
relations between the sovereign and individuals from the 
time of Machiavelli to the modern state (Marshall, 1990, p. 
15), methods which Foucault calls micro-technology are 
used. These methods bring together the exercise of power
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and the constitution of knowledge in the organization of
space and time along ordered lines, so as to facilitate
constant forms of surveillance and the operation of
evaluation and judgement. Thus, power-knowledge produces a
distinction between normality and abnormality. This view
of the power-knowledge relation presupposes locality and
particularity of truth and is very different from the
traditional Marxist view of ideology. According to the
classical Marxist view, power relates to knowledge
primarily through the ways it serves to distort or mystify
the truth. However, according to Foucault:
Truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a 
myth whose history and functions would repay further study, 
truth isn't the reward of free spirits. . .Truth is a thing of 
this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of 
constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each 
society has its regime of truth, its 'general politics' of 
truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and 
makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which 
enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means 
by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures 
accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those 
who are charged with saying what counts as true. (1980, p. 131)
In order to analyze this power-knowledge relations, he 
uses genealogy, which also shows his strong antagonism 
toward any kind of universal and totalizing discourse. 
Genealogy denies continuity in history and "does not 
pretend to go back in time to restore an unbroken
continuity that operates beyond the dispersion of forgotten 
things." Neither is it genealogy's duty "to demonstrate 
that the past activity exists in the present, that it 
continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a 
predetermined form to all its vicissitudes" (1977, p. 146) . 
So, for Foucault, an exploration into the past (which is an 
examination of or search for "descent") is "not the 
erecting foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs what was 
previously considered immobile; it fragments what was 
thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was 
imagined consistent with itself" (1977, p. 147) . He seems 
to be denying the Western optimism that the absolute and 
universal Truth lies at the origin of what we know, and 
says, "the origin lies at a place of inevitable loss, the 
point where truth of things correspond to a truthful 
discourse, the site of a fleeting articulation that 
discourse has obscured and finally lost" (1977, p. 143) . 
What is important for Foucault is not search for the lost 
origin, the absolute Truth, or the universal and unifying 
Spirit but faithful genealogical exploration into the past.
If the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in metaphysics, 
if he listens to history, he finds that there is "something 
altogether different" behind the things: not a timeless and
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essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence or 
that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from 
alien forms. (1977, p. 142)
This genealogical exploration into the past made him notice
such local and subjugated things as discontinuity,
irrationality, and madness which had been "behind the
things," that is, behind the disguise of continuity and
universal rationality of history. His focuses were, in
structuralist terms, not only on the historical presences,
but equally on the absences which had made the presences
present in history by way of differences. He freely
travels into the past, "free from the restraints of
positive knowledge," and "descends to seize the various
perspectives, to disclose dispersions and differences, to
leave things undisturbed in their own dimension and
intensity" (1977, p. 156).
However, once again, he warns against the danger of
totalization in genealogy:
these genealogies... were not possible and could not have been 
attempted except on one condition, namely that the tyranny of 
globalising discourses with their hierarchy and all their 
privileges of a theoretical avant-garde was eliminated, (1980, 
p. 83)
His local, and probably too humble, attitude towards power 
and struggle made some critics call his description of
power "Schopenhauerian will" (Taylor, 1986, p. 88) for 
which no one is responsible. This line of criticism 
usually comes from those who prefer emancipatory discourse. 
As Lather maintains (1990, p. 32), however, the 
emancipatory discourse is much a part of Foucault's "rdgime 
of truth." In the Foucauldian space, the binaries that 
structure so much of emancipatory discourse implode from 
"us versus them" to a multi-centered discourse with 
differential access to power. The totalizing desire to 
establish foundations is displaced by a move toward a self­
critique that traces our own collusion in the very cultural 
dominations we are opposing via the intersection of our 
liberatory intentions and the "will to power" that 
underscores interpretation.
For Foucault, power is not the prerogative of a 
dominant class which exercises it actively upon a passive, 
dominated class; and the working class, or the 
intellectual, has no historical mission in acquiring it. 
Actually, there can be no such thing as a historical 
mission in Foucauldian historical contingency. Because 
power is multiple and ubiquitous, the struggle against it 
must be localized. Although genealogy is a radical form of
criticism, its specific critical contribution is not so 
much, or not primarily, to criticize institutions and 
persons, but instead to make criticizable the forms of 
knowledge, the standards of rationality, or principles of 
reasoning not only on the basis of which such institutions 
arise and turn out to be "reasonable," "useful" and "self- 
evident," but also on the basis of which the violence of 
these institutions becomes natural and justifiable (Kusch, 
1991, p. 214). The power relation is not to be found in 
terms of causality, of events at one level causing or 
explaining events on another, but rather in a series of 
aims and objectives. However, these are not attributable 
to an individual subject, not even to a ruling caste, but 
arise in an apparently anonymous way from local situations 
in which they first appear. Where there is power there is 
resistance; power relations depend on a multiplicity of 
points of resistance, which serve at once as adversary 
target, support, foothold (Sarup, 1983, p. 99).
So, rather than analyzing the working of factually 
existing institutions, genealogy seeks to identify the 
network of knowledge, the standards of rationality or 
rationalities that make these institutions possible and
that justify them. Since it is the central premiss of 
genealogy that knowledge and power are internally- 
essentially related, genealogy cannot remain on the level 
of violence and coercion in institutions like prison; it 
has to study the frameworks of thinking and knowledge that 
inform these institutions. As Foucault himself admits 
(1977, pp. 206-207), activities and effects of The Groupe 
d ‘Information sur les Prisons (6.1.P.) in the years 1971- 
1972 (Foucault, 1980, p. 143; Patton, 1979, pp. 109-111, 
138; Sheridan, 1980, p. 130) illustrate this genealogical 
concept of local struggle and local victory.
Some Marxists criticize Foucauldian theory as 
"abandoning class analysis," "ignoring that disciplinary 
power techniques are applied precisely to ensure the 
reproduction of the social relations of the capitalist mode 
of production," and "severing power relations from an 
understanding of class domination and the state as a 
political form of the rule of the capital" (Sarup, 1983, p. 
101) .
Foucault not only rejects class analysis, which attempts to 
derive existing forms of power from the productive relations of 
capitalist society,- he also repudiates the concepts of ideology, 
state and party. The Foucauldian approach, though it produces 
very interesting work, puts into question many categories that 
marxists take for granted, {p. 102)
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However, the points that are made by some critics as 
weaknesses of Foucauldian theory, on the contrary, give us 
an important insight into the way of breaking the limit 
placed by an attempt to understand society from a 
totalitarian view. A myth of totalization and 
universalization not only evidences the teleological 
speculation immanent in the Marxist view of history but 
also is related to the reductionistic tendency which 
reduces all social problems to the capitalist mode of 
production. This reductionism is inherent also in class 
determinism and econo-centrism. This seems to be the 
fundamental reason that so-called orthodox Marxism has 
become vulgarized and dogmatized despite its embellishment 
with dialectic and praxis, which can be seen easily in 
social movements in Korea. Through discourse analysis 
which decenters and localizes power, the Foucauldian 
approach contributes to extend the logic of resistance and 
liberation by unshackling it from the teleological 
speculation.
Thus, despite some critics' interpretation of "his
^  (
reluctance to make value judgements," Foucault's attitude
/
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towards the possibility and form of resistance to power is 
pretty firm:
One should not assume a massive and primal condition of 
domination, a binary structure with 'dominators' on one side and 
'dominated' on the other, but rather a multiform production of 
relations of domination which are partially susceptible of 
integration into overall strategies... there are no relations of 
power without resistances; the latter are all the more real and 
effective because they are formed right at the point where 
relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not 
have to come from elsewhere to be real, nor is it inexorably 
frustrated through being the compatriot of power. It exists all 
the more by being in the same place as power; hence like power, 
resistance is multiple and can be integrated in global 
strategies. (1980, p. 142)
Foucault calls the element of resistance inherent in power 
relations "a certain plebeian quality aspect" {p. 138) . 
While doubting that the plebs is a genuine sociological 
entity, and while denying that the plebs can be identified 
with the proletariat, he suggests that the plebeian quality 
is "a centrifugal movement, an inverse energy, a discharge" 
and that it can be found all over the social body "in a 
diversity of forms and extensions, of energies and 
irreducibilities":
This measure of plebs is not so much what stands outside 
relations of power as it is their limit, their underside, their 
counter-stroke, that which responds to every advance of power by 
a movement of disengagement {p. 138).
3.2. Local Intellectual and Local Knowledge
As a matter of course, Foucault does not think every 
power relation is bad in itself although he describes
mainly negative and repressive power in one of his early 
writings (1971). He makes a distinction between inevitable 
or harmless, and avoidable or harmful forms of power.
Thus, because "'truth' is linked in a circular relation 
with systems of power," we cannot emancipate it "from every 
system of power {which would be a chimera, for truth is 
already power)." What matters is to detach "the power of 
truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time" 
(1980, p. 133). While, as described before, genealogy is 
suggested by Foucault himself as the concrete method of 
analyzing hegemonial power, he makes it clear in many other 
contexts that the form of power against which we should 
struggle is a "negative," "repressive," "bad form of", or 
"hegemonial" power. But, according to him, a mode of 
action which acts directly and immediately on others is not 
power. He excludes this mode of action from the concept of 
power, thus also from the hegemonial power, calling it 
violence.
Power exists only when it is put into action... it acts upon 
their {other’s) actions: an action upon an action, on existing 
actions or on those which may arise in the present or the 
future. A relationship of violence acts upon a body or upon 
things...On the other hand a power relationship can only be 
articulated on the basis of two elements which are indispensable
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if it is really to be a power relationship: that "the other"
(the one whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and 
maintained to the very end as a person who acts...In itself the 
exercise of power is not violence. (1983, pp. 219-220)
Thus, Foucault's (local) struggle or resistance is
only against hegemonial power, analyzing and deconstructing
the system of discourses produced by the combination of
hegemonial power and knowledge. This local struggle cannot
be performed by the "universal" intellectual, the "bearer
of universal value" (1980, p. 132) who was "derived from a
quite specific historical figure: the man of justice, the
man of law, who counterposes to power, despotism and the
abuses and arrogance of wealth, the universality of justice
and the equity of an ideal law" (p. 128). The universal
intellectual speaks for humanity with the tone of prophecy
and promised pleasure and locates him- or herself, as
spokesman for conscience and consciousness, in the
privileged spot "outside of power and within the truth"
(Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983, p. 130). Foucault advises the
intellectual to abandon his arrogance or, perhaps, burden
of "can and must apply universally" (1980, p. 128) and
emphasizes the role of the new local or specialized
intellectual.
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The figure in which the functions and prestige of this new 
intellectual are concentrated is no longer that of the 'writer 
of genius1, but that of the 'absolute savant1, no longer he who 
bears the values of all, opposes the unjust sovereign or his 
ministers and makes his cry resound even beyond the grave. It 
is rather he who, along with a handful of others, has at his 
disposal, whether in the service of the State or against it, 
powers which can either benefit or irrevocably destroy life. He 
is no longer the rhapsodist of the eternal, but the strategist 
of life and death. (1980, p. 129)
Because Foucault describes the term of local or specific 
intellectual always as "not of the universal intellectual," 
the meaning of the term is somewhat ambiguous and 
uncertain, which Foucault himself admits (1980, p. 132) . 
However, Poster observes the specific intellectual as "a 
creature of the twentieth century with its fragmentation of 
knowledge, its multiplication of disciplines, its infinite 
expansion of research centers, its explosion of the printed 
world, its professionalization of discourse" (1982, quoted 
in Kenway, 1990, p. 175). In other words, Foucault 
decenters the universality and centrality of the 
(universal) intellectual. While the universal intellectual 
claims to struggle for the universal Truth, the local 
intellectual's aim is more humble and vivid. While the 
former can be easily isolated from the masses because of
the abstractness of his aim, the latter can struggle
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against hegemonial power more effectively by virtue of the 
vividness and concreteness of his aim.
Like the universal intellectual in Marxist discourse 
of ideological struggle, the local and specific 
intellectual is referred to in the context of (local) 
struggle against hegemonial power. Thus, such writers as 
Giroux (1992; 1988; Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991) and Kenway 
(1990) equate the Foucauldian local and specific 
intellectual with the counter-hegemonic intellectual 
described in Gramsci's hegemony theory although Aronowitz 
distinguishes Foucauldian intellectual's work, calling it 
"antihegemonic," from Marxism's counter-hegemony to 
liberalism or dictatorship (Aronowitz and Giroux, 1991, p. 
155). Giroux maintains that Foucault's notion of the 
specific intellectual must be combined with Gramsci's 
notion of the engaged intellectual "who connects his or her 
work to broader social concerns that deeply affect how 
people live, work, and survive" (1992, p. 82). This 
equation or combination of Foucault's and Gramsci's 
intellectual seems to be possible because the hard-liner 
Italian communist, like his non-Marxist counterpart and
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unlike other Marxist theorists, negates econo-centrism and 
class determinism.
However, all the ideological critiques, including 
Gramsci's concept of hegemony which is said to be built on 
ideology, presuppose, at least "ideologically," a state of 
truth after being awakened from false consciousness. Thus, 
the ideological critiques tacitly presuppose the 
bifurcation between false consciousness and truth, on which 
Foucault does not agree. For Foucault, as quoted at the 
beginning of this section, we cannot emancipate truth from 
every system of power because truth is already power. So, 
"the essential political problem for the intellectual is 
not to criticise the ideological contents supposedly linked 
to science, or to ensure that his own scientific practice 
is accompanied by a correct ideology, but that of 
ascertaining the possibility of constituting a new politics 
of truth. The problem is not changing people's 
consciousness...but the political, economic, institutional 
regime of the production of truth" (1980, p. 133). Truth 
is not a privilege which can be enjoyed only by those who 
have emancipated themselves from false consciousness. It 
is not "the ensemble of truths which are to be discovered
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and accepted" but rather "the ensemble of rules according 
to which the true and the false are separated and specific 
effects of power attached to the true" (1980, p. 132) .
The local struggle or resistance by the local or 
specific intellectual aims, in the end, at analyzing and 
deconstructing the present social, economic, and cultural 
hegemony by detaching the power of truth from them. As 
examples of these local struggles, Foucault lists those 
which have emerged since the late 1960s: women have begun 
to question male dominance more radically, children 
question the authority of their parents, and psychiatry is 
criticized for its control over the mentally ill, medicine 
is criticized for its treatment of the sick, and 
administrations and bureaucracies are criticized for their 
interventions in the realm of the individual (1983, p.
211). These resistances have similar local character, that 
indicates "an autonomous, non-centralized kind of 
theoretical production, one that is to say whose validity 
is not dependent on the approval of the established regime 
of thought" (1980, p. 81). Local, specific, or subjugated 
knowledge means, on the one hand, "historical contents that 
have been buried and disguised in a functionalist coherence
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or formal systemisation" and, on the other, "something 
which in a sense is altogether different, namely a whole 
set of knowledge that have been disqualified as inadequate 
to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive 
knowledges, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the 
required level of cognition or scientificity" (1980, pp. 
81-82) .
For Foucault, knowledge is arbitrary and truth is 
related to particular rationalities. He does not believe 
in the absolute truth or universal rationality. In every 
society, the production of discourse, the word Foucault 
uses interchangingly with knowledge, is "at once 
controlled, selected, organized and redistributed according 
to a certain number of procedures, whose role is to avert 
its power and its dangers" (1971, p. 216). There are a 
number of procedures of exclusion operating in discourse. 
Those are prohibition, division-rejection, and opposition 
between the true and the false. Needless to say, the third 
procedure of exclusion, that is, the opposition between the 
true and false, is the most dominant and the most all- 
pervasive although Foucault admits that speaking of the 
opposition is "a little risky" (p. 217). It is risky
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because he apparently does not want to be fettered with the 
absolute relativism or Sophists' paradox. Thus, he says:
Certainly, as a proposition, the division between true and false 
is neither arbitrary, nor modifiable, nor institutional, nor 
violent. Putting the question in different terms, however -- 
asking what has been, what still is , throughout our discourse, 
this will to truth which has survived throughout so many 
centuries of our history; or if we ask what is, in its very 
general form, the kind of division governing our will to 
knowledge -- then we may well discern something like a system of 
exclusion (historical, modifiable, institutionally constraining) 
in the process of development, (p. 218)
The truth, and power, of discourse resided, not in what was 
said, but in who said it and how it was said. Plato's will 
to seek true knowledge also could not be excluded from this 
Foucauldian concept of will to truth or to knowledge. In 
discussing how different disciplines are constituted, he 
shows that knowledge can fix meaning, representation, and 
reason; that the very organization of the discourse can be 
an exercise of power, controlling and restraining what can 
be said as well as the right to speak. Formation of the 
modern human sciences, too, is a new feature of the will to 
truth and knowledge and is to discipline people effectively 
(1979a; 1979b).
However, while he urges insurrection of the local and 
subjugated knowledge against the privileged, so-called 
"absolute and universal" knowledge, and while he holds that
rational judgements can only be made on the basis of 
historically contingent standards, the concept of the local 
knowledge does not seem to be endorsing Kuhnian cyclical 
incommensurability. Instead, Foucault himself 
demonstrates, case by case, how allegedly timeless 
categories have had historically contingent origins, as his 
works show. Thus, in a very similar way that Lyotard 
presupposes the existence of the particular rule(s) in a 
particular language game, Foucault denies neither the use 
of the concepts "true" and "false" nor the possibility of 
the particular and local rationality within one local 
discourse.
3.3. Lyotard and Locality
Although the existence of a set of rules is necessary 
in order for us to communicate at all with one another in a 
particular language game, Lyotard does not admit any 
possibility of communication between different language 
games. His main point in the debates regarding 
postmodernism is very simple and flat: rejection of all 
kinds of grand theories. He defines postmodern as 
"incredulity toward metanarratives" (1984, p. xxiv). 
According to him, science, especially contemporary science,
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has tried to legitimate its existence, since Plato, with 
recourse to (philosophical) narrative because "the language 
game of science does not have the resources to legitimate 
their truth on its own" (1984, p. 28) . Science shuffles 
off the legitimation to the (philosophical) narrative and 
seeks the good, justice, truth, emancipation, progress, 
etc. Lyotard calls this grand narrative.
Scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is true 
knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of 
knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all.
(1984, p. 29)
He sees contemporary science, which is founded on and which 
seeks for performativity and efficiency, as positivistic 
(1984, pp. 53-54) . Needless to say, his pejorative use of 
the word "positivism" reflects the history of the debates 
about the nature of science, after the demise of logical 
positivism and after Kuhn and Feyerabend. In the 
postmodern science,
working on a proof means searching for and "inventing" 
counterexamples, in other words, the unintelligible; supporting 
an arguments means looking for a "paradox" and legitimating it 
with new rules in the games of reasoning. (1984, p. 54)
The anti-metanarrative theme is characterized as a 
surprising transformation, new experiments, or a sudden 
rupture with the past. It is rejection of social, moral, 
political, or psychological theories, as well as any
metaphysical or epistemological views that posit a 
synthetic or natural/ historical telos towards which we are 
inevitably heading or which we might prescribe. The 
postmodern science rejects any identification with any 
established systems of knowledge by undermining 
continuously its own basis of legitimation. Its 
legitimation process is equated with the generation of 
other statements and other rules of language game.
"Science possesses no. general metalanguage in which all 
other languages can be transcribed and evaluated" (1984, p. 
64). There is no "grand scheme" of the natural and social 
world that is unfolding or capable of being enacted.
Lyotard criticizes those totalizing social theories of 
Parsons and Luhmann. He calls those "terrorist." By 
terror he means,
the efficiency gained by eliminating, or threatening to 
eliminate, a player from the language game one shares with him.
He is silenced or consents, not because he has been refuted, but 
because his ability to participate has been threatened (there 
are many ways to prevent someone from playing). The decision 
makers' arrogance, which in principle has no equivalent in the 
sciences, consists in the exercise of terror. (19B4, pp. 63-64)
He, in a strikingly similar way to Foucault's 
explanation of knowledge and power, combines the problems 
of knowledge with those of society. According to him, the
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question of the legitimacy of science has been 
indissociably linked to that of the legislator since the 
time of Plato.
The right to decide what is true is not independent of the right 
to decide what is just...there is a strict interlinkage between 
the kind of language called science and the kind called ethics 
and politics.. .knowledge and power are simply two sides of the 
same question: who decides what knowledge is, and who knows what 
needs to be decided? In the computer age, the question of 
knowledge is now more than ever a question of government. (1984, 
pp. S-9)
In this postmodern computer age, then, knowing tends to
"amoralize" itself because knowledge is no longer mind-
training power (Bildung) (1984, p. 4) but an object of
consumption. "Knowledge ceases to be an end in itself"
(1984, p. 5). It no longer matters whether knowledge
contributes to a grand, synthetic telos. But he never sees
the postmodern society as being amoral, that is, putting
ethical problems aside, and depending only upon the
automatized information process. Thus, he criticizes
Habermas's concept of the universal Diskurs which is
allegedly based on the universal consensus through
communication as "doing violence to the heterogeneity of
language games" (1984, p. xxv). Lyotard maintains:
Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value. But justice 
as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect. (1984, p. 66)
In fact, he locates Christianity as the root of the 
"Occident" grand narrative such as Habermas's project of 
Enlightenment, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit, or Marx's 
project of emancipation which seems to have "lost all of 
its critical power" as ethical and political theory after 
the Berlin Wall fell {1993, p. 114) . Against 
metanarratives which totalize historical experience by 
reducing its diversity to a one-dimensional, all- 
encompassing logic, he posits a discourse of multiple 
horizons, the play of language games, and the terrain of 
micropolitics. As Giroux summarizes (1991, pp. 19-20), 
Lyotard, against the formal logic of identity and the 
transhistorical subject, invokes a dialectics of 
indeterminacy, varied discourses of legitimation, and a 
politics based on the "permanence of difference."
In order to advocate postmodern culture, Lyotard 
borrows Wittgenstein's concept of language games. In his 
view, all the events in postmodern society are language 
games or transformations of them, and the language games 
can be analyzed in terms of their performativity and 
consequent claims to legitimation and power. The narrative 
form lends itself to a great variety of language games,
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among which are denotative statements about the natural 
world; denotic statements regarding social relations; 
interrogatives, evaluatives and so forth (1984, pp. 9-10). 
Language game is defined as follows:
Each of the various categories of utterance can be defined in 
terms of rules specifying their properties and the uses to which 
they can be put --in exactly the same way as the game of chess 
is defined by a set of rules determining the properties of each 
pieces, in other words, the proper way to move them (1984, p.
10) .
Language games have the following three rules. First, 
their rules do not carry within themselves their own 
legitimation but are the object of a contract, explicit or 
not, between players. Second, if there are no rules, there 
is no game, that even an infinitesimal modification of one 
rule alters the nature of the game, that a "move" or 
utterance that does not satisfy the rules does not belong 
to the game they define. Third, every utterance should be 
thought of as a "move" in a game (1984, p. 10).
Thus shown, Lyotard's emphasis in his reading of 
Wittgenstein is obvious. He seems to be combining 
Wittgenstein's language game with the arbitrary character 
of signifier, signified, and thus, language in Saussurian 
linguistics. He wants to focus on the arbitrary character 
of the rules of the various language games and of the
various forms of life, and eventually of the thing we call 
knowledge. Consequently, the character of postmodern 
knowledge consists, unlike Habermas's argument, in 
dissension, not in consensus in opinion. "Consensus is a 
horizon that is never reached" (1984, p. 61). Because the 
professional or the elite has the power to decide which 
knowledge should be acquired by consensus and which 
knowledge is true, in Lyotard's view, paralleling 
Foucault's, Habermas advocates knowledge produced by the 
elite. On the contrary,
it is possible to conceive the world of postmodern knowledge as 
governed by a game of perfect information, in the sense that the 
data is in principle accessible to any expert: there is no 
scientific secret. Given equal competence (no longer in the 
acquisition of knowledge, but its production), what extra 
performativity depends on in the final analysis is 
"imagination," which allows one either to make a new move or 
change the rules of the game. (1984, p. 52)
As it is impossible to judge the existence or validity of 
narrative knowledge on the basis of scientific knowledge 
and vice versa (1984, p. 26), and as nobody speaks all 
languages and there is no universal metalanguage (1984, p. 
41), a particular language game can not dominate nor 
control (an)other language game(s). There is an 
incommensurability between language games (1984, p. 23). 
This recognition of the heteromorphous nature of language
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games is, for Lyotard, a first step to an idea and practice 
of justice that is not linked to that of consensus. The 
second step is
The principle that any consensus on the rule defining a game and 
the "moves" playable within it must be local, in other words, 
agreed on by its present players and subject to eventual 
cancellation (1984, p. 66) .
Thus, Lyotard sees all kinds of knowledge, language 
games, and forms of life as locally determined. In other 
words, validity of knowledge is judged only in a particular 
language game by the local players of the game, here and 
now, and is not transferable to any other forms of 
knowledge or language games. Viewed in this light, Lyotard 
does not seem to reject a possibility of consensus between 
the players at least in a language game, and at least in 
his The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, which 
is most frequently referred to among his writings and on 
which this section of my study is mostly dependent. As a 
matter of fact, the latter Wittgenstein's concept of 
language games presupposes consensus of opinion among the 
participants of a particular language game, which becomes 
ironically, as Prado describes (1992), the foundation of 
Habermas's universal pragmatics. However, after his 
Postmodern Condition, Lyotard develops further the concept
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of incommensurability so that he finally denies any 
possibility of consensus within a language game, not to 
mention between language games. Whereas he later renounces 
the concept of language game and atomizes it to the
incommensurability between phrases (1988; 1987; Lecercle,
1992), he suggests, even within a language game, an 
incommensurability between addressor and addressee.
Not only is there an incommensurability within a game between 
the position of recipient and that of utterer, for example (it
is not always pronounced, but it is extreme in the case of
obligation), but from game to game, for the "same" position, 
there is incommensurability: it is not the same thing to be the 
recipient of a narrative, and to be the recipient of a 
denotative discourse with a function of truthfulness, or to be 
the recipient of a command. (Lyotard and Thdbaud, 1985, p. 94)
In other words, "tolerance of differences" has been
replaced with "respect of differences" in his later works;
thus, "a radical pluralism" and "an absolute relativism"
have become often-used words to criticize Lyotard. This
makes some critics, in Giroux's terms (Aronowitz and
Giroux, 1991, p. 68) , appropriate Lyotardian postmodernism
in a reactionary way and others in a progressive way.
It is still disputable whether his emphasis on "the
transition between heterogeneous phrases" and on
"respecting their heterogeneity" (Lyotard, 1987, p. 180)
can be identified with absolute relativism in epistemology
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and ethics, or whether he abandoned his interest in truth 
and justice at all. It seems to be sufficient in this 
study, however, to point out that Lyotard has never given 
up his interest in truth and justice, at least in his 
Postmodern Condition, and that, on the contrary, the main 
interest of his philosophy is in truth and justice, as 
analyzed so far in this section. He does not insist on the 
impossibility of truth claims and of moral judgement, but 
on the possibility of local, and thus plural and multiple, 
processes of verification and justification according to 
the various language games.
3.4. A New Concept of Local Curriculum
Whereas Foucault says that we should struggle only 
against a "negative," "repressive," or "hegemonial" power, 
as was described in section 3.2., he admits the anonymity 
and evasiveness of power.
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did 
anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought 
to obey it? What makes power holds good, what makes it 
accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as 
a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, 
it induces pleasure, forms of knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a negative 
instance whose function is repression. (1980, p. 119)
"Human sciences" are good examples of disciplinary forms of 
knowledge which, by objectifying and materializing people, 
are used to superimpose the power and to produce docile 
bodies. According to Foucault, a developed industrial 
society is the carceral, all across which power-knowledge 
relations distinguish the normal from the abnormal, to 
qualify, to classify and to punish, using the human 
sciences ("from psychiatry to pedagogy, from the diagnosis 
of diseases to the hiring of labour"; 1979a, p. 185) as 
technique of judgement and examination. The human sciences 
make disciplinary power exercised "invisibly." The school 
is "a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted examination"
(1979a, p. 186), where this disciplinary power, with the 
help of the human sciences, forms "a whole series of codes 
of disciplinary individuality" (1979a, p. 189) and makes 
each individual a "case" (1979a, p. 191) . The human 
sciences therefore play an important part in the creation 
of disciplined subjects, that is, individuals who conform 
to certain standards of sanity, health, docility, 
competence, and so on. This kind of epistemic view on the 
human science, or knowledge and discourse at large, can 
never entail a sense of the absolute Truth or of a unifying
rationality. Rather, as Kusch describes (1991, p. 215), 
Foucault stresses the analysis of rationality in the 
plural. However, Foucault suggests to us that to work with 
the simple opposition between reason and unreason, or with 
the notion of a bifurcation of reason into emancipatory and 
technical-strategical, is unhelpful. On the one hand, 
relying on the dichotomy "reason versus unreason" forces us 
to say either that the disciplinary institution and its 
justification is based on reason or that it is based on 
unreason. In the first case, we place ourselves outside of 
rationality and thus on the side of irrationality. In the 
second case, we fail to realize the reasoning underlying 
the institution, and thus underestimate its specific 
rationality and effectiveness.
As Foucault's analysis of the human sciences shows, 
then, we teachers and educators, in a regime of truth 
called education, or more specifically curriculum, should 
examine, as is described in 3.1., the basis on which - 
historically contingent - principles of reasoning, or which 
local frameworks certain strategies of control and 
punishment are rationally defensible. To paraphrase 
Lyotard, we should focus on the particular and local rules
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on the basis of which we educators, teachers and students
are playing our language game at the present time. A
language game called education is:
the instrument whereby every individual, in a society like our 
own, can gain access to any kind of discourse. But we well know 
that in its distribution, in what it permits and in what it 
prevents, it follows the well-trodden battle-lines of social 
conflict. Every educational system is a political means of 
maintaining or of modifying the appropriation of discourse, with 
the knowledge and the powers it carries with it. (Foucault,
1371, p. 227}
"Discipline" as a form of knowledge on which teachers' 
so-called "professionalization" is based also limits and 
controls our knowledge (1971, pp. 222-224/ Sheridan, 1980, 
p. 126). It constitutes an anonymous system that is 
available to anyone who wishes to use it: it is a corpus of 
propositions regarded as true, a set of rules and 
definitions, techniques and instruments. A discipline is 
what makes new statements, new propositions possible. But 
it is not simply all that may be said to be true about 
something. For every discipline is made up of errors as 
well as truths, and these errors are not merely foreign 
bodies to be ejected in time from the organism of the 
discipline, but have often played an active, necessary part 
in history. For a proposition to belong to a particular 
discipline, it must refer to a specific range of objects,
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which, however, changes from one period to another. To 
belong to a discipline, a proposition must also refer to a 
certain body of theory. The discipline is, thus, a 
principle of control in the production of discourse. It 
fixes limits through an identity that takes the form of a 
permanent reactivation of rules.
The teacher who is professionalized in at least one 
discipline or form of knowledge unconsciously, or 
consciously, "excludes" knowledge and discourses that do 
not conform to the established rules of his or her own 
language game. The teacher usually does not realize the 
local, arbitrary, contingent, and transient character of 
the rules with which s/he is playing his or her language 
game. New propositions, statements, and rules of the 
discipline or the language game which are different from 
those of his or her own professionalized discipline are not 
allowed. As Foucault points out properly (1983, p. 216), 
however, the professionalization or individualization is 
one of the technologies of the power-knowledge relation, 
along with totalization, to produce docile bodies. Thus, 
as Labaree (1992) interprets Foucault (pp. 128-129), the 
process of teacher professionalization is also seen to be a
103
symptom of growing disciplinary power. Foucault himself is 
pretty clear about this:
Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as 
they are free. By this we mean individual or collective 
subjects who are faced with a field of possibilities in which 
several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
comportments may be realized. where the determining factors 
saturate the whole there is no relationship of power; slavery is 
not a power relationship when man is in chains. (1983, p. 221)
At the very moment teachers think they are subjects free 
from power and have professionality in a localized 
curriculum policy, they are prisoners of totalizing power 
called disciplines and are committing a terror of excluding 
dissents, combining Foucauldian and Lyotardian terminology. 
Labaree (1992) analyzes the illusionary character of 
teacher professionality in power relations of the recent 
effort to professionalize (though not "localize") teachers 
in the United States supported by the Carnegie Foundation 
and the Holmes Group, and maintains that the effort is to 
raise teacher educators' status (in power relations), not 
teachers' own.
Although McLaren (1994) says, regarding this, invoking 
Lyotard, "few criticalists in education still ascribe to 
the notion of freestanding autonomous subject self­
fashioned through free will and good intentions" and
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"subjectivity is now recognized as bearing a constitutive 
relationship to social power and the relationships to which 
it gives rise" (p. 322), it is very doubtful that this 
remark is appreciated by all "criticalists" and 
professionalized teachers.
Admitting that the Foucauldian concept of "discipline" 
is not directly concerned with academic disciplines as 
forms of knowledge, Giroux borrows the Foucauldian concept 
to explain arbitrariness of an academic discipline which is 
the essential part of teachers' professionality:
what is studied under the aegis of an academic discipline at any 
given time is not natural subject matter, but a field which is 
itself constituted by the practice of the discipline. Such a 
field is not arbitrary in the sense that it develops randomly or 
on whim; rather, a field can be called arbitrary because it is 
contingent on historical circumstance. Hence it reflects 
cultural, social, and institutional demands. (1988, p. 145)
While acknowledging their stability in the short run, 
Cherryholmes (1988) also holds that, agreeing to Foucault's 
argument that power makes truth possible, "transcendental 
signifieds for academic discipline are in the long run 
fictional" (p. 148) . It was an accident of history with no 
single author, according to him (Cherryholmes, 1988, p.
139), that disciplinary structure became a transcendental 
signified for curriculum. Once it was in place, it
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determined who could speak and what could be said. Hence, 
curricularists and teachers are not in control of their 
discourse; quite the reverse, dominant discursive practices 
dictated who is a curricularist and a teacher.
The most visible and official form of these dominant 
discursive practices in the actual classroom is, of course, 
the textbook. So-called "legitimate" knowledge is made 
available in schools through the textbook. Apple (1989; 
1986) is one among those who analyze the ideological and 
political character of the school textbook. According to 
him (1989, pp. 156-157), the curriculum in most American 
schools is not defined by courses of study or suggested 
programmes, but by one particular artifact, the 
standardized, grade-level-specific text in mathematics, 
reading, social studies, science and so on. The impact of 
this on the social relations of the classroom is also 
immense. Apple estimates that 75 per cent of the time that 
elementary and secondary students are in classrooms and 90 
per cent of the time that they are doing homework is spent 
with text materials. This phenomenon is more conspicuous 
in Korea where all the textbooks are published or censored 
by the central government, teaching outside the content of
106
the textbook is prohibited as a general rule, and textbooks 
are (mis)identified with curriculum (2.2. in this study).
In England also, the textbook is regarded as "a composite 
cultural commodity which provides an authoritative 
pedagogic version of received knowledge," and textbooks are 
"not just imposed on pupils by teachers, but imposed first 
on teachers by their employers or by the state" (Stray, 
1994, p. 4).
While Olson (1989) sees the source of the authority of 
textbooks being from "the divorce of the speaker from his 
utterance" (p. 233), Luke and others (1989) argue that the 
authority of textbooks comes mainly from the historical, 
social, or institutional contexts in which those texts are 
owned, taught, and studied (pp. 245-260). According to 
them, textbooks have authority because the social 
institutions authorize them. Drawing on Foucauldian view 
of knowledge and post-New Criticism literary theory, they 
argue that knowledge is not, nor could it be, "in the text" 
solus and that the background knowledge of the reader and 
the social situation of the act of reading determine the 
meaning, interpretation and criticism of the text. In 
other words, there is no fixed meaning in text. Thus, "the
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text is rewritten with each reading" (Luke, de Castell, and 
Luke, 1989, p. 249). This interpretation of authorship is 
in exact accord with Foucault's refusal "to maintain the 
sovereign function of the author with respect to his own 
texts" (Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115). Regarding his 
own texts, Foucault says:
A book is made to be used in ways not defined by its writer.
The more new, possible or unexpected uses there are, the happier
1 shall be. (Morris and Patton, 1979, p. 115)
Like this, Foucault decenters authority of a text from the 
author to the reader. The Foucauldian concept of author as 
the unifying principle in a particular group of writings or 
statements, which is one of procedures limiting and 
controlling discourse (Foucault, 1971, pp. 221-222), is 
correspondent to the Lyotardian concept of metanarrator who 
seeks legitimation of his or her own metanarrative by doing 
violence to the heterogeneity of the language game, and 
thus by prohibiting local determination of the validity and 
the rules of the game.
Unlike ordinary texts, school textbooks always 
presuppose an existence of an arbiter called teacher. Luke 
and others describe the relation among the text, the
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teacher, and the students as following, which shows what 
Foucault would call anonymity of the author's power:
The school text is always the object of teacher mediation. One 
instructs with and through the text; a student confronts textual 
knowledge via teacher mediation. In classroom situation the 
text is the locus of information exchange. Inasmuch as the text 
for a particular subject, theme, or topic constrains the content 
of classroom information exchange, so does the teacher mediate 
the exchange between student and text. And within this 
communicational system of the classroom, a system supporting a 
particular structure of information exchange, the student 
assumes acquiescent, non-authoritative status in relation to 
both the text and the reader. (Luke, de Castell, and Luke,
1989, p. 252)
Thus for students, the text stands as an iconic marker of 
authority, both a symbol and an agent of institutional 
power and the teacher becomes a "surrogate author" (Luke, 
de Castell, and Luke, 1989, p. 257). This authority might 
be what most debates for decentralization or localization 
of curriculum seek for under the name of teacher autonomy, 
as we have seen in the last chapter. However, according to 
Foucault, this teacher authority or autonomy in (localized) 
classrooms is only "pseudo-sovereign" (1977, p. 222), and 
"the man described for us whom we are invited to free, is 
already in himself the effect of a subjection much more 
profound than himself" (1979a, p. 30) .
Again, as far as the teacher assumes the status of a 
surrogate author or a metanarrator, which seems to have
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been an important part of a localized curriculum policy or 
teacher professionalization, s/he is committing a violence 
in Foucauldian terms and committing a terror in Lyotardian 
terms to his or her students. The way the teacher can 
escape from committing this terror or violence and from an 
illusion of professionality and individuality seems to be, 
paradoxically, deprofessionalization of him- or herself, in 
the sense that s/he can be really free from totalizing 
power and from metanarrative only through what Pignatelli 
(1993) calls "self-detachment" (p. 417). Self-detachment 
is an abandonment of Voltaire-like attitude and an 
insurrection of local, low-ranking, or subjugated knowledge 
(Foucault, 1980, pp. 81-83), namely local struggle by the 
local intellectual.
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to 
refuse what we are. We have to imagine and to build up what we 
could be to get rid of this kind of political "double bind," 
which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of 
m o d e m  power structures. (Foucault, 1983, p. 216)
From a political view, this self-detachment from his or her 
discipline or professionalization could lead to "an 
undermining of the hope to discover or create a true theory 
or an accurate description of a just society" (Beyer and 
Liston, 1992, p. 374), but could open "the way for a
broader, less privileged, and more public contest about 
what is valued and who gets heard" (Pignatelli, 1993, p. 
422). Instead of Pignatelli's self-detachment, Kiziltan 
and others (1990) pick up the term limit-attitude as a 
strategy of Foucauldian (local) struggle, which Foucault 
uses in his "What is Enlightenment?" (1984) and which is 
not very different from self-detachment. The end of this 
limit-attitude is "to separate out from the contingency 
that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer 
being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, think"
(Foucault, 1984, p. 170; Kiziltan, Bain, and Canizares M., 
1990, p. 364).
"The use of paralogy" (Fritzman, 1990; Kiziltan, Bain, 
and Canizares M., 1990), which is often considered as 
Lyotardian strategy for "a war on totality" (Lyotard, 1984, 
p. 82), is very similar to the Foucauldian strategy for 
local struggle. It is to respect the little narrative 
[petit reci-t] and to generate other statements and other 
game rules. It is to produce not the known, but the 
unknown and to search dissension, not consensus, by 
activating the differences. It is to present the
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unpresentable and to use imagination, which allows one 
either to make a new move or change the rule of the game.
When .a teacher deprofessionalizes him- or herself, 
s/he can realize, and hence resist the power of regime of 
truth, whether it is individualizing or totalizing, 
centralized or decentralized to the state. S/he can 
recognize the nature of recurring games or regimes of truth 
by revaluing the local, subjugated, oppressed, other, 
different knowledge. What the teacher should deal with is 
not whether something is true or false but determination of 
the distinction between true and false and of the criteria 
for what is admitted for consideration as true or false 
(Kiziltan, Bain, and Canizares M., 1990, p. 359).
However, this deprofessionalization, self-detachment, 
limit-attitude, or use of paralogy never means trivializing 
or abrogating teachers' identity and role in the classroom 
as much as Foucauldian and Lyotardian anti-humanism does 
not mean the death of humanity at all. Rather, as Doll 
(1993) indicates, it seeks for local decisions involving 
students, teachers, and local mores and traditions instead 
of deus ex machina type control and authority (p. 167) . 
Moreover, it is never an easy task for a teacher to abandon
his or her privileged authority and alleged autonomy within 
a professionalized discipline, to stress and promote 
"dissimilarity, constant decentering, endless deferral, and 
recurring doubt," and to impel "the multiplicity and 
fluidity of the self, knowledge, and the world" (Kiziltan, 
Bain, and Canizares M., 1990, p. 366). It is many times 
more arduous and perplexing than enj oying one' s 
individuality and professionality in a closed system of 
knowledge. It should be an ordeal and a challenge, 
ontological and epistemological, to a teacher.
CHAPTER FOUR
DIALOGUE AS A PRACTICE OF LOCAL CURRICULUM
4.1. Dialogue and Contemporary Educational Theory
If the teacher appreciates the arbitrariness of 
disciplines and deprofessionalizes him- or herself, the 
concept of professional autonomy also has to be changed. 
Autonomy can no longer be interpreted as an audacious and 
privileged superimposition of disciplinary (in both senses 
of the word) knowledge upon students nor as the Cartesian 
subjectivity of knowledge nor as the Habermasian agent of 
Enlightenment. It is an autonomy as a generator, not a 
regulator, of new rules and statements and as an analyzer 
of regime of truth by delegitimatizing willingly one's own 
specialities. The teacher is no more than a player of 
language game(s) and has to tolerate and respect other 
moves of the game(s).
The importance of this self-detachment, limit- 
attitude, or imagination is not exclusively focused on by 
so-called "post-" philosophers such as Foucault and 
Lyotard. Pinar (1980; 1988a; 1988b; 1994) also raises 
questions about a stable, authentic self. For him, self is
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what we create, or construct (or deconstruct) , as we read, 
write, speak and listen. It is "always in motion and in 
time, defined in part by where it is not, when it is not, 
what it is not" (1994, p. 220). Although he does not 
explicitly endorse "post-" philosophies, Pinar's concept of 
autobiography is affinitive to Foucault's concept of 
genealogy as counter-memory or as search for descent, thus 
suggesting more specific ways of applying the concept of 
local curriculum developed so far in this study. As 
genealogy disturbs what was previously considered immobile 
and fragments what was thought unified, autobiography "can 
serve as a method for enlarging, occupying and building the 
space of mediation," and it "enlarges the space by pushing 
back the edges of memory, disclosing more of what has been 
forgotten, suppressed and denied" (1994, p. 217) .
Moreover, Pinar's call for (the curriculum theorist's) 
continual willingness "to give oneself up, including one's 
point of view (in dialectic movement)" (1994, p. 119) is in 
perfect accord with the Foucauldian strategy of local 
struggle: self-detachment or limit attitude. His concept 
of currere represents a call for the cultivation of such an 
internal dialectic. "It is a call to examine one's
115
response to a text, a response to an idea, response to a 
colleague, in ways which invite depth understanding and 
transformation of that response" (Pinar, 1994, p. 119).
The following passage resonates Foucault's antagonism 
against universal intellectuals and Lyotard's rejection of 
metanarrative, too:
A few scholars and theorists lay claim to timeless truths, and 
having completed the task of their own salvation - intellectual 
not spiritual in this secular age - they devote themselves to 
the conversion of others. (Pinar, 1980; 1994, p. 119)
He defines the relation between students and curriculum as 
a "dialogical encounter" (1994, p. 126) between the knower 
and the known in which social and intellectual situations 
are dialectically transformed, although his autobiography 
also includes dialogue between self-self and self-other, 
as well as dialogue between self-object.
Pinar's early emphasis on this dialogical nature of 
curriculum theory and classroom activities, on the fluidity 
of self and knowledge, and on differences seems to have 
presaged the later influences of the French philosophers on 
curriculum and education. Recently, albeit in various 
contexts, the concept of dialogue has been combined with 
the postmodern concept of difference and further developed
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by some curriculum theorists (for example, Burbules, 1993; 
Bowers and Flinders, 1990; Ellsworth, 1989; Burbules and 
Rice, 1991; Noddings, 1986; Shor, 1992; Shor and Freire, 
1987; Giroux, 1988), most of whose arguments are placed in 
the tradition of Freire's "critical pedagogy" and invoke 
so-called "post-" theories to a certain extent.
As is widely known, one of the central concepts of 
Freire's critical pedagogy is dialogue, along with 
liberation, reflection, real consciousness, problem-posing, 
oppression, etc. The goals of critical pedagogy are 
expressed as a critical democracy (or "radical democracy," 
Giroux, 1988, p. 75), individual freedom, social justice, 
and social transformation -- a revitalized public sphere 
characterized by citizens capable of cultural action for 
freedom and against domination "inside and outside a 
classroom where the status quo is challenged, where the 
myths of the official curriculum and mass culture are 
illuminated" (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 12). Dialogue is 
an important form of praxis to transform the world in 
critical pedagogy. It is even an "existential necessity" 
(Freire, 1970, p. 69) because people transform the world by
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naming it, speaking their world, and thus achieve
significance as human beings.
Dialogue does not exist in a politica.1 vacuum...To achieve a 
goal of transformation, dialogue implies responsibility, 
directiveness, determination, discipline, objectives...Dialogue 
means a permanent tension in the relation between authority and 
liberty. But in this tension, authority continues to be because 
it has authority vis-a-vis permitting student freedoms which 
emerge, which grow and mature precisely because authority and 
freedom learn self-discipline. (Shor and Freire, 1987, p. 16)
In critical pedagogy, dialogic method is proposed as 
"empowering the disadvantaged" (Shor, 1992, p. 105} and 
ultimately transforming unequal society by putting limits 
on the teacher's dominating voice and calling on the 
students to codevelop a joint learning process. Thus, the 
critical pedagogy regards the concept of dialogue as an 
opportunity for the oppressed to express their subjugated 
voices. As can be noticed in Burbules's works (1993; 
Burbules and Rice, 1991) , dialogue is suggested by some 
"critical theorists" as an important means to bridge the 
gap between its traditional (or modern) liberatory 
discourses and the postmodernist concepts of difference and 
locality. Consequently, their concept of dialogue can not 
help putting an emphasis on similarity as well as 
differences. The similarities would be, naturally, those 
of oppression, pain, and alienated feelings. In "post-"
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theories, they would argue, a politics that highlights 
different struggles with similar intent is missing (Kanpol, 
1992, p. 42). Giroux (1990) also points out that what is 
sorely lacking in postmodern educational literature is 
attention to both a theory and politics of similarity 
within difference and a politics of democracy, difference 
and cultural struggle (p. 6).
This concept of dialogue is epitomized in a recently 
published book {Burbules, 1993). Although he uses such 
postmodernist concepts as difference and 
incommensurability, Burbules (1993; Burbules and Rice,
1991) places much importance on sameness in the concept of 
dialogue. He argues, "any concrete discussion of 
difference also implies sameness: two objects, two people, 
two points of view, and so on can be contrasted usefully 
only when there are at least some respects on which they 
are similar" (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p. 403). He 
distinguishes two varieties of postmodernism: postmodernism 
per se and antimodernism. He illustrates the work of 
Giroux and McLaren as postmodernist and prizes the work as 
an attempt to reappropriate and expand modernist concepts 
such as democracy, liberty, rights, citizenship, and so
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forth to the postmodernist terrain. He defines 
antimodernist position as being characterized by a strong 
antipathy to the languages, issues, and values of 
modernism, and seeks to formulate an entirely different 
problematic. Hence it is not concerned with recapturing 
and reformulating modern values, such as reason and 
equality, according to him, but with deconstructing them 
and rejecting them. He further argues:
Having deconstructed all metanarratives and radically 
relativized all possible values, antimodemism is left with no 
clear way of justifying any alternatives.. .Antimodemism lacks 
a clear conception of a "positive freedom" that identifies 
social conditions in which freer thought and action are 
possible; lacking this antimodemism has not been able to 
articulate a clear and defensible educational theory. (Burbules 
and Rice, 1991, pp. 398-399)
Thus, his concept of dialogue is related to "a clear 
conception of a positive freedom that identifies social 
conditions in which freer thought and action are possible" 
and heavily relies on the Habermasian communicative 
competence from which he draws "general rules of 
communication" (1993, pp. 72-78) and on the Chomskian 
linguistic competence or deep structure which he does not 
directly mention. As is widely known, Habermasian 
communicative theory and Chomskian theory of deep/surface 
structure presuppose the universal rationality which
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enables human beings to communicate with each other 
"rationally" and, ultimately, reach consensus among 
themselves and to make sense of other languages (or to make 
those translatable).
Dialogue aims at the reconciliation of differences or the 
formation of new common meanings... The ordinary experience of 
translation across natural languages tells us that the usual 
case is that effective common meanings can be established, and 
that sufficient equivalences can be built over time so that 
speakers of any two languages can achieve a significant degree 
of mutual understanding and effective coordination of 
action...our ways of thinking and speaking about our world also 
exhibit striking commonalities. (Burbules and Rice, 1991, p.
408)
Burbules1s goal of dialogue is in exact line with that of 
Giroux whose theory he strongly supports: "all voices and 
their differences become unified both in their efforts to 
identify and recall moments of human suffering and in their 
attempts to overcome conditions that perpetuate such 
suffering" (Giroux, 1988, p. 72).
However, he ignores not merely the fact that a simple 
word like "father" gains other meanings that the original 
word did not have or loses some meanings that it originally 
had when it is translated into another natural language.
He also overlooks the fact that consensus or common meaning 
is, if it is possible, as Lyotard indicates(1988), only "a 
particular state of discussion" (pp. 65-66) and thus
contingent and subject to be deconstructed and disseminated 
at the very moment the common meaning or consensus is 
constructed. Moreover, rules of a language game are not 
the kind that could be pre-set but should be locally 
determined by the players. Rules of dialogue also can not 
be prescribed as Burbules tries to do, but determined by 
the players of the game of dialogue because, as Bowers and 
Flinders indicate, "dialogue is a locally managed approach 
to interaction" (1990, p. 149). Generally speaking, 
dialogue in critical pedagogy, as well as Burbules's, is 
not based on Foucauldian self-detachment or Pinar's "giving 
oneself up."
Ellsworth (1989), whom Burbules describes and 
criticizes as antimodernist, also is critical of these 
pre-set goals and rules of classroom dialogue. She, 
quoting Aronowitz, argues that the critical pedagogue is 
one who enforces the rules of reason in the classroom -- "a 
series of rules of thought that any ideal rational person 
might adopt if his/her purpose was to achieve propositions 
of universal validity" (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 304). Under 
these conditions and given the coded nature of the 
political agenda of critical pedagogy, only one political
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gesture appears to be available to the critical pedagogue. 
S/he can ensure that students are given the chance to 
arrive logically at the "universally valid position" 
underlying the discourse of critical pedagogy -- namely, 
that all people have a right to freedom from oppression 
guaranteed by the democratic social contract, and that in 
the classroom, this proposition be given equal time vis-a- 
vis other sufficiently articulated and reasonably distinct 
moral positions. Consequently, for Ellsworth:
Dialogue in its conventional sense is impossible in the culture 
at large because at this historical moment, power relations 
between raced, classed, and gendered students and teachers are 
unjust...conventional notions of dialogue and democracy assumes 
rationalized, individualized subjects capable of being fully 
rational and disinterested...fundamental moral and political 
principles are not absolute and universalizable, waiting to be 
discovered by the disinterested researcher/teacher. (Ellsworth,
1989, p. 316)
Burbules tries to escape the weakness that Ellsworth 
attributes to critical pedagogy and its concept of dialogue 
by emphasizing repeatedly mutual respect, tolerance of 
diversity, difference, open-endedness, and so on. However, 
his attempt to establish a "non-teleological" concept of 
dialogue does not seem to be successful because he refuses 
to abandon universal rationality and the possibility of 
common meaning or consensus as a basis of dialogue, which 
makes his standpoint somewhat ambiguous and sometimes
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equivocal. To paraphrase Bakhtin, Burbules, as well as 
other critical pedagogists, tries to establish as much 
predictability as possible, and so to constitute, to some 
extent a "centripetal," unifying or totalizing force 
(Emerson and Morson, 1987, p. 46) while trying to admit a 
fragmenting, centrifugal pull. His own "pragmatic 
approach" to dialogue has a danger of replacing differences 
with "rational persuasion" (1993, p. 164, his citation from 
Bernstein), if not terror or violence.
Thus, the concept of dialogue in most of the 
contemporary educational theory is not adequate for 
classroom practice in a context of local curriculum that 
this study has developed. In Korea where the content of 
curriculum is prescribed by the central government and 
teachers are "professionalized" according to the fields in 
the curriculum, this "rational" dialogue tends to be easily 
used as a means of accomodationg students to the present 
regime of truth and delivering fixed meanings provided by 
the form of a textbook.
Besides the inadequacies explored so far, the concept 
of dialogue in most of the contemporary theories of 
education and curriculum reveals another limit. It deals
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mainly with dialogue between, in Pinar's terms, self-other. 
The concept of dialogue does not consider dialogue between, 
again in Pinar's terms, self-self and self-object except 
that Freire (1970) mentions a bit about the possibility of 
expanding the concept of dialogical landscape to the 
relation between self-object.
4.2. Bakhtinian Dialogism
In written speech, lacking situational and expressive supports, 
communication must be achieved only through words and their 
combinations; this requires the speech activity to take 
complicated forms -- hence the use of first drafts. The 
evolution from the draft to the final copy reflects our mental 
process. Planning has an important part in written speech, even 
when we do not actually write out a draft. Usually we say to 
ourselves what we are going to write; this is also a draft, 
though in thought only. (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 144)
Vygotsky's emphasis on the dialogic character of inner 
speech like the quotation above is known as an influence of 
Mikhail Bakhtin (Matejka, 1986, pp. 171-172) who argues 
that every discourse refers to at least two subjects and 
thus to a potential dialogue between them (Todorov, 1984, 
p. 62). Bakhtin calls this "the phenomenon of internal 
dialogization" (Bakhtin, 1981). Thus, monologue is 
dialogic, too.
Bakhtin's dialogue is roughly divided into two kinds. 
One is dialogue between discourse and the generalized Other 
which can be seen in his early writings; and the other is
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dialogue between discourses themselves, emphasized in his 
later writings. Kristeva's term of "intertextuality" is 
used to introduce the later concept of dialogue (Todorov, 
1984, p. 60).
The very being of man (both internal and external) is a profound 
communication. To be means to communicate.. .To be means to be 
for the other, and through him, for oneself. Man has no 
internal sovereign territory; he is all and always on the 
boundary; looking within himself, he looks in the eyes of the 
other or through the eyes of the other. . .Life is dialogical by 
its very nature. To live means to engage in dialogue, to 
question, to listen, to answer, to agree, etc. (Todorov, 1984, 
pp. 96-97)
For Bakhtin, the present discourse is recognized as a 
representation of a world view and the absent discourse 
another, and dialogue is constructed between these two 
different representations of world views. Meaning of a 
word is no exception:
The word is b o m  in a dialogue as a living rejoinder within it; 
the word is shaped in dialogic interaction with an alien word 
that is already in the object. A word forms a concept of its 
own object in a dialogical way. But this does not exhaust the 
internal dialogism of the word. . .The word in living conversation 
is directly, blatantly, oriented toward a future answer-word: it 
provokes an answer, anticipates an atmosphere of the already 
spoken, the word is at the same tiime determined by that which 
has not been said but which is needed and in fact anticipated by 
the answering the word. Such is the situation in any living 
dialogue. (Bakhtin, 1981, pp. 279-280)
All words have already been used and carry within 
themselves the traces of preceding usage, and "things" 
themselves have been touched, in at least one of their 
previous states, by other discourses that one cannot fail
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to encounter. Thus, for Bakhtin, the "actual meaning" of 
an utterance "is understood against the background of other 
concrete utterances on the same theme, a background made up 
of contradictory opinions, points of view and value 
judgements" (1981, p. 281). However, this meaning is never 
the universal, absolute one. It is a conditional meaning 
acquired in a situation where one meaning and (an)other 
dialogue with one another. It is a product of a 
negotiation which is a part of the process where meaning is 
continuously recreated in a specific space and time. There 
is no fixed, universal meaning because meaning is locally 
determined in an interaction between all possible meanings.
There is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which 
have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect 
the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is 
actually settled at the moment of utterance...There can be no 
actual monologue. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 426)
Bakhtin calls this process of creation and recreation 
of conditional meaning "refraction" (1981, pp. 299-300). 
When a reader reads a text, he can trace the "angle of 
refraction" of authorial discourse as it passes through 
various other voices, or voice- and character-zones. But 
there are other refracting media as well, including that 
mass of alien words present not in the object but in the
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consciousness of the reader (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 432) .
Bakhtin calls the base condition governing the operation of 
meaning "heteroglossia" (p. 263).
It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At 
any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of 
conditions —  social, historical, meteorological, physiological 
-- that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at 
that time will have a meaning different than it would have under 
any other conditions. (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 428)
Heteroglossia is a situation where new meanings, new
language games, and new rules are generated, the situation
of a subject surrounded by the myriad responses he or she
might make at any particular point. It is a way of
conceiving the world as made up of a roiling mass of
languages, each of which has its own distinct formal
markers. As Holquist interprets it (1990), heteroglossia
assumes that such contingent details as differences in the
weather or in the physical condition of the speakers are
reflected in utterance and have an effect on the way formal
linguistic features can convey meaning (pp. 69-70) .
Thus, as Maranhao summarizes (1990, p. 3), Bakhtin
explains dialogues between self -(other)self, self-other,
and self-object, as mutually constituting. The subject's
"conceptual horizon" represents the circle of one's vision,
that is, the refractions imposed upon reality and at the
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same time constitutive of reality from the point of view of 
a self addressing an other.
Emerson and Morson {1987) name several terminologies 
which are foundations of Bakhtin's dialogism: 
unfinalizability, war on system, dissolving oppositions, 
polyphony, chronotopes and anachronism, and carnival, all 
of which correspond to Foucauldian and Lyotardian concepts 
of locality. "Unfinalizability" is used to imply the human 
tendency to defy all that purports to be fixed and stable. 
"Man [sic] is not a final and defined quantity upon which 
firm calculations can be made" (Emerson and Morson, 1987, 
p. 44). Humans always have a tendency to dialogue with 
others, seeking new, open meanings. For Bakhtin, universal 
system is the antithesis of human freedom. The very notion 
of system suggests "finalizability" in which desire for 
dialogue is suppressed and new meanings are shut up, 
whereas he views the world as an interaction of systemic 
and nonsystemic elements, each of which merges and emerges 
in largely unpredictable and contingent patterns.
Bakhtin's rejection of Saussurian (or Jakobson’s) binary 
oppositions can be well seen in the following quotation:
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My attitude toward Structuralism: I am against enclosure in a 
text. Mechanical categories: “opposition," "changing in
codes"...But I hear voices in everything {as quoted in Emerson 
and Morson, 1987, p. 47)
Symmetrical opposition between langue-parole, signified- 
signifier, society-individual, and other-self in Saussurian 
linguistics is dissolved and replaced with difference and 
simultaneity by Bakhtinian dialogue because the concept of 
dialogue is based upon the "inner duality" of each 
opposition. "Polyphony," which implies that many 
unfinalizable voices are heard at the same time, uttering 
the same word differently, and "chronotope," which Bakhtin 
coined to indicate differences of people and their 
utterances and thoughts conditioned by space and time, 
both stand against Habermasian universal rationality, 
sameness, telos, and all kinds of determinism. "Carnival" 
is the name Bakhtin gave to the spirit of creative 
destruction, to revivifying parody. It is similar to 
Foucauldian genealogy and Lyotardian paralogy.
Carnival... is a means for displaying otherness: carnival makes 
familiar relations strange... Carnival is both the name of a 
specific kind of historically instanced thing...and an 
immaterial force which such particular instances 
characteristically embody. {Holquist, 1990, p. 89)
Carnival represents the denial of supposedly eternal 
truths, asserting that there are no eternal truths. It
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parodies the official norms synecdochically and preaches 
the "joyous relativity" of all things. Carnival is the 
world of dialogue where contradictions are blessed.
As Daelemans and Maranhao interpret Bakhtin (Daelemans 
and Maranhao, 1990, p. 232), any given language is a 
congeries of languages. Every utterance is an additional 
decentering of something already said. The utterance in a 
dialogic turn taking receives an author who becomes 
identified as "the creator of the utterance" (Todorov,
1984, p. 61); in the speech situation the utterance is the 
"face" of the speaker. Nevertheless, the utterance is far 
from exhausting the uniqueness and individuality of its 
author. In a way, every utterance creates its author, but 
for Bakhtin, man cannot be reduced to the statements s/he 
utters. The utterance only identifies its author in the 
absence of a correlative utterance expressing an 
alternative world view. Consequently, to speak means to 
enter the realm of endless dialogue about the world.
4.3. Dialogue in the Classroom
When asked the question "What does chrysanthemum 
connote in the poem By Chrysanthemum?," all high-school 
students and graduates in Korea reply immediately, "A
beauty of maturity!" That would very likely be their 
answer if they have been "normally" attending the Korean 
Language and Literature class. They are taught so. It 
does not matter whether a student was touched by white 
chrysanthemums at a solemn funeral from which s/he has just 
returned or has just received the flower from a friend. 
There is no place for Bakhtinian heteroglossia and 
dialogue, nor phenomenological pre-understanding. 
Differences among students are totally ignored by the pre­
defined meaning of the word. Only one fixed rule of the 
language game governs the classroom, and any other rules or 
new language games are not allowed. No matter who decides 
the meaning of curriculum and textbooks -- the government, 
the author, or a specialized art critic or literary critic 
-- the meaning cannot be "refracted" against other 
meanings. Students' "other" utterances, inner or outward, 
are superseded by standardized and objective answers and 
are forced to remain a monologue.
Competitive college entrance examinations instigate 
and worsen the situation. Teacher-proof curricular 
materials are promoted so that any dialogue, between 
teacher-self, teacher-other teachers, teacher-student,
teacher-texts, student-self, student-other students, and 
student-texts, is impossible. Teacher-proof materials 
suppress all possible voices emanating from dialogue other 
than the one the present regime of truth can allow. 
Teacher-proof materials turn the teacher into a technician 
whose major function is to implement someone else's 
teaching methods and materials, and thus turns one's own 
voice into someone else1s . This monologic method of 
teaching might have contributed to the Korean students' 
high scores on standardized achievement tests which demand 
only one correct answer to a question. However, unlike 
what some critics argue (Epstein, 1992; Center for the 
Assessment of Educational Progress, 1989; National 
Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), scores on 
standardized tests cannot be identified with the "quality 
of education." Those high scores are accomplished by 
reinforcing the teacher, through the process of 
professionalization, specialization, or individualization, 
to play a universal author or transcendental metanarrator, 
and at the price of differences, heteroglossia, and 
dissents. These are the result of a highly centralized 
curriculum policy in which only pre-set objectives can be
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achieved, as was shown in chapters 2 and 3 of this study. 
This former policy can not be bettered by just espousing 
local curriculum policy, especially in Korea where all the 
contents of curriculum and the methods of instruction are 
prescribed virtually by the central government.
Under the circumstances where one fixed meaning of a 
text is anticipated, no matter whether it is centralized 
curriculum policy or localized one, no dialogue is 
possible. If it were possible, it would be the one that 
aims at consensus or "rational persuasion," not at the 
generation of new meanings, new rules, and new language 
games. A capable teacher is the one who can accept and 
provide all possible, not anticipated, meanings of a text 
and, thus, one Lyotard would call "imaginative." As 
Gadamer says (1979, p. 216), the belief that one fixed 
objective meaning can be obtained is an illusion. Meaning 
occurs at the diachronic and synchronic intersection of 
dialogue. It is unfinalizable, never ceasing to dialogue 
with other meanings.
Curriculum, centralized or localized, is implemented 
and realized by the teacher. Even under an alleged 
localized curriculum, classroom practices can never be
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localized if the teacher is just satisfied with just his or 
her professionalized disciplinary knowledge and tries only 
to deliver a prescribed set of knowledge. Such practices, 
though, would be a much easier job than questioning and 
deconstructing continuously, both his or her identity and 
knowledge.
Once again, dialogue in a classroom is possible only 
when the teacher appreciates the historical contingency of 
one's own disciplinary knowledge in power-knowledge 
relations. It is the teacher's self-detachment, limit- 
attitude, imagination, use of paralogy, giving oneself up, 
and deprofessionalization that is needed in the Bakhtinian 
concept of dialogue.
In the end, localizing curriculum is not a matter of 
transferring the power of "selecting" curriculum content 
from the central government to the locale. It is 
localizing the teacher's identity and knowledge, which is 
possible only by realizing the dialogic nature of identity 
and knowledge.
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study aims at suggesting that curriculum 
localization cannot be achieved by mere change in 
curriculum policy. Because the actual implementer of the 
curriculum is the teacher, any curriculum policy cannot be 
localized unless classroom practice is localized. From a 
Foucauldian point of view, power is no longer centered only 
around the State. The school and the classroom where 
knowledge is developed, refined and transmitted to students 
are basically "disciplinary" institutions to produce docile 
bodies. The teacher cannot escape from the regime of truth 
and becomes a docile body unless s/he struggles against the 
regime. However, this struggle against power-knowledge 
relations is never easy because we have little control over 
an anonymous and powerful discourse that is a product of 
power-knowledge relations. The anonymous and powerful 
discourse not only is used by power, unlike what most of 
the Marxist critics argue, but also produces power which is 
multiple and ubiquitous. This study shows that the 
multiple and ubiquitous form of power in schools and
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classrooms is the teacher's professionalized and 
specialized knowledge. As long as s/he remains in, and is 
satisfied with his disciplinary knowledge, the teacher 
produces bodies docile to the regime of truth and is 
personally a docile body.
The struggle should be local by the local 
intellectual. The struggle for the local curriculum should 
be local in the classroom by the local teacher. It should 
be against totalizing regime of truth of which the teacher 
is already a part, that is his or her disciplinary 
knowledge. Foucault calls this local struggle "self- 
detachment."
Lyotard's rejection of all kinds of grand theories is 
also related to the concept of local curriculum in that he 
delegitimates all-encompassing and totalizing knowledge, 
defining it as terroristic. For Lyotard, knowledge and 
power are simply two sides of the same question: who 
decides what knowledge is, and who knows what needs to be 
decided? Classroom practice by which "knowledge" is a main 
concern also is a field of representing power. Thus, 
playing only one language game by only one rule in the 
classroom is terroristic, blocking possible heterogeneity
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and differences. According to Lyotard, the character of 
knowledge in this postmodern era consists in dissension, 
not in consensus of opinion. He sees all kinds of 
knowledge, language games, and forms of life as locally 
determined. In the classroom, the validity of knowledge 
should be judged only in a particular language game by the 
players, including the teacher and students, here and now, 
and is not transferrable to any other forms of knowledge or 
language games.
Despite a promise to localize curriculum in the new 
Korean National Curriculum, the teacher will be a prisoner 
of totalizing power called disciplines and will commit the 
terror of excluding dissensions as long as s/he thinks 
him- or herself as a subject free from power and armed with 
professional knowledge. Especially under the condition 
that most of the textbooks are published or approved by the 
central government, the teacher's professional knowledge is 
often identified with that of the textbook and of the 
dominant regime of truth. However, the textbook does not 
hold the authority of transcendental signified any more. 
There is no fixed meaning in the textbook, and the textbook 
is rewritten with each reading.
Although, in Korea, there have been efforts of 
teachers to struggle against the authority of the 
prescribed knowledge in the textbook since 1989, most of 
those efforts place emphasis on ideological struggles based 
on political programs that are "emancipatory", rather than 
on heterogeneity and differences of language games in the 
classroom or on the local determination of knowledge. This 
is especially true of the book by the Teachers Association 
for Korean Language and Literature {Teachers Association 
for Korean Language and Literature, 1989a). The writers of 
the book urge teachers to cultivate "true consciousness" 
among students by helping them understand their own 
oppressive reality. This emancipatory and liberatory telos 
assumes a universal grand narrative and fails to recognize 
and generate new rules of the language game in the 
classroom other than the ones which teachers pre-decide to 
be acceptable in order to "conscientize" their students.
Similar schemes are found in contemporary educational 
discourses about dialogue which is suggested to bridge the 
gap between the universal emancipatory theory of education 
and differences in the classroom. Similarity rather than 
differences is emphasized in the concept of dialogue in the
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critical pedagogy of Freire, Giroux, and Shor, as well as 
in Burbules's argument. The rational human being who has 
universal rationality for communication is presupposed in 
the concept.
However, as Lyotard argues, consensus is a horizon 
that is never reached. Consensus or common meaning 
deconstructs itself as soon as it is reached. Bakhtin's 
concept of dialogue, which is based on such concepts as 
unfinalizability, death of the author, meaning as a 
historical "event," intertextual construction of meaning, 
heteroglossia, polyphony etc., could give us more pertinent 
insight for dialogue which can manage the locality in the 
classroom.
"Locality" in curriculum localization should be in 
classrooms. The content of curriculum should be ultimately 
determined by the players of language games or dialogues in 
the classroom. Dialogue in the classroom should not 
anticipate any consensus or common meaning rather than 
differences and should aim at generating new rules and 
language games.
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